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ABSTRACT
Discontent with global relations is causing policy
pressures which are reminiscent of pressures -hich existed
when isolationism dominated American foreign policy. Among
these pressures are; fear of abandonment or exploitation,
preoccupation with domestic well-being and attendant
dissociation from global relations, and advocacy of trade
barriers to check foreign competition. This paper discusses
isolationism's influence during three periods in American
history--pre-World War I (1914 to 1916), pre-World War II
(1922 to 1941), and the "Cold War" (1947 to the present)--
to develop an understanding of isolationism in U.S. foreign
policy, of isolationism's evolution from the traditional
variant Washington advocated in 1796, and of isolationism's
potential to again influence U.S. foreign policy.
iii
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"Isolationism" has influenced American foreign policy
since the United States was founded, but the nature of
isolationism has metamorphosed from its original
manifestations. Although the period following the Second
World War is notable for the negligible role isolationism has
played in American foreign policy, the possibility exists
that conditions might emerge which renew isolationist
sentiment in the United States. The problem will be
addressed primarily at the level of government policy
formulation, and will occaisionally refer to elite influence
on foreign policy formulation where appropriate. Popular
opinion will be referred to in those instances where such
opinion is considered to be supportive of the purpose of this
paper.
B. THE TERMS OF ISOLATIONISM
Establishing the meanings of the terms of reference for
isolationism will contribute to clarity during this paper.
Isolationism is regularly used to refer to any aversion to
foreign involvement, but isolationism in American foreign
policy has exhibited different variants. This paper will
generally ccnfine itself to four expressions of foreign
policy involvement in discussing isolationism. These are;
1
traditional isolationism (neutrality), revisionist (strict)
isolationism, non-interventionism, and interventionism.
Where necessary for clarity, these terms will be used,
otherwise the generic term "isolationism" will be used.
1
1. iso:ationism
The term "isolationism" implies a strict refusal to
enter into agreements of mutual aid and reciprocal
obligations. A more accurate description of the foreign
policy ideals of the pre-intervention period of World War I,
however, could be "neutrality", or "traditionalist
isolationism", in which the right to conduct commercial
intercourse with any other country, even with warring
belligerents, was a principle worthy of being defended.
Another form of isolationism is strict, or
"revisionist isolationism". This form, advocates autarky and
non-involvement, and dominated American foreign policy
principles during the pre-intervention period of World War
II. During this period, legislators attempted to define, and
prevent a recurrence of, the events which led to American
intervention in World War I.
1 David L. Porter, The Seventy-sixth ConQress and World
War II, 1939-1940 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri
Press, 1979), 1-15; Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots of
Isolationism (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1966), 1-12; and Albert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning
of the American Doctrine of Isolation," American Political
Science Review 34:3 (June 1940): 540-545, discuss the
different terms relating to isolationism and
internationalism. The four terms presented here have been
distilled from the discussions of these gentlemen.
2
2. Internationalism
The counterpart to isolationism is internationalism,
which supports active participation in foreign relations. As
with isolationism, internationalism has two components, of
which one is interventionism. Supporters of interventionism
advocate a strong military which can Le used as necessary to
exert American influence in foreign affairs. War is a
continuation of politics by other means--this well-worn
Clausewitzian cliche is best amplified by another, more
sparingly quoted principle Clausewitz provided--combat is to
war as cash transactions are to business. Taken together,
these two ideas provide the framework of interventionist
perspective; the ability to prevail in combat is often a
"bottom line" in politics.2 Interventionist policies accept
the possible need to exert military persuasion to support or
defend uniquely American interests.
Examples of interventionist policy are rife in
twentieth century American history. A strong military
presence in Europe and the Mediterranean since 1948, the
Vietnam Conflict from 1965 to 1973, a naval presence in the
Persian Gulf since 1987, and the invasior of Panama in 1989,
are four obvious examples of interventionism. Each example
demonstrates America's willingness to use military force to
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translation by Routledge
and Kegan Paul, Ltd. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
1908; New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1982), 119, 296.
3
support its interests, which is the essence of
interventionist policy.
The second component of internationalism is non-
interventionism. Proponents of non-interventionism support
active participation in international relations as fully as
do interventionists, albeit under the auspices of
international organizations, such as the United Nations.
Non-interventionists do not rule out the eventuality of using
force; the discouraging lessons of the Kellogg-Briand Pact
and the League of Nations clearly demonstrate the frailty of
international organizations which have no recourse beyond
moral compulsion. Non-interventionists prefer, however, to
restrain the use of military force to that conducted in a
cooperative, multi-national effort only after other options,
such as sanctions or embargoes, have failed. President W.
Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations after World War I,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the 1920's, and U.S. support for
the United Nations during the decades following World War II
are but a few examples of non-interventionism.
C. THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Tsolationism is firmly rooted in the earliest history of
the United States, and a brief discussion of early American
isolationism will contribute to developing the historical
basis for the specific periods which are to be more fully
discussed at a later point in this paper. Isolationism in
early American international relations benefited from
4
America's geographical detachment, dominance of a virgin
continent, and cultural-institutional divergence from
European societies.3 These combined advantages afforded the
United States a degree of confidence and righteousness
regarding foreign policy-making which is clearly evident in
early policy pronouncements by American leaders. When
national interests were threatened, U.S. policy exploited the
country's geographical insulation to keep Europe's dogs of
war at bay.
1. Washington's Farewell Address
The most famous statement regarding American foreign
policy was delivered one hundred ninety-four years ago.
President George Washington's farewell address stated, in
part,
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have
with them as little political connection as possible. So
far as we have already formed engagements let them be
fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop
• . Why forego the advantages of [our detached and
distant situation)? . . . Why, by interweaving our
destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our
peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition,
rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent
alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far,
I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it . . ..
3 Weinberg, 540.
5
Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable
establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may
safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary
emergencies ....
The aversion with which American political leaders of
the late 18th century viewed Europe was conditioned largely
by the realpolitik in which the European governments were
engaged. Repeatedly, alliances were forged, yet quickly
broken when one party had achieved its goals, irrespective of
the agendas of other alliance members. Additionally, French
diplomats attempted to use the Franco-American alliance of
1778 to bind America to the aid of France in 1793 when
Britain, Holland and Spain joined the German powers in
opposing the French in February of that year. America was in
a precarious position to lend support to France--British and
Spanish colonies surrounded the United States on the North
American continent, and British blockades could too easily
hinder American trade with Europe.5 Neutrality provided the
only course by which the new American government could
protect its commercial interests and preserve its right to
decide upon its own course.
Washington's farewell address stood, for over one
hundred fifty years, as a warning against entangling
alliances with Europe. His caution regarding the dangers of
4 David F. Long, ed., A Documentary History of U.S.
Foreign Relations (Washington: University Press of America,
1980), vol. I, From 1760 to the Mid-1890s, 24.
5 Felix Gilbert, To The Farewell Address (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1961), 116-119.
6
becoming involved in the intrigues and quarrels of the
European powers was the first comprehensive and authoritative
statement of the principles of American foreign policy, and
encompassed the interests and ideals of the modern world's
first constitutional republic.6 It sought to disengage the
United States from what was viewed as the seething cauldron
of power politics which was Europe, while conceding the
reality of pragmatic foreign alliances during exigencies, and
the essential need to expand commercial ties.
2. The Monroe Doctrine
Events in Europe during the early nineteenth century
compelled the United States to take a firmer stance regarding
its independence from Europe. The Monroe Doctrine, defined
in President J. Monroe's 02 December, 1823 message to
Congress, expanded Washington's policy statement. Monroe's
statement further strengthened Washington's original policy
and broadened the scope of U.S. interests, saying,
In the wars of the European powers in matters relating
to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it
comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our
rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent
injuries or make preparation for our defense . ...
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable
relations existing between the United States and those
[European] powers to declare that we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion
of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety . .
. it is impossible that the allied powers should extend
6 Gilbert, 135-136.
7
their political system to any portion of either [American]
continent without endangering our peace and happiness . .
7
While Washington's policy was motivated by a desire
to avoid becoming drawn into a European war, Monroe's policy
statement was motivated by more defensive considerations.
The Holy Alliance, formed by the monarchs of Russia, Prussia,
and Austria in 1815, was sworn to "protect Religion, Peace
and Justice", and strongly supported the status guo. The
alliance's members expressed a right to intervene in internal
affairs of European powers to prevent or reverse changes
wrought by revolution; actions taken by the Holy Alliance in
1821 and 1823 had protected the thrones of Piedmont, Naples
and Spain. When the members of the Holy Alliance began to
consider the task of restoring Spanish-American colonies in
the New World to Spain, however, the U.S. government was
compelled to assert its interests in the Americas, and to
forestall the Holy Alliance's aims.
8
The Monroe Doctrine specifically identified two
points regarding America's interests in the hemisphere.
First, it extended the protection of the United States to
cover all of the Americas in an effort to ensure European
colonial competition would not spill over to adversely affect
the interests of the United States. Secondly, it once again
7 Long, 57.
a Gordon A. Craig, Europe. 1815-1914, 3d ed. (Hinsdale,
IL: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972), 19-24.
8
emphasized America's disinterest in Europe's affairs. The
technology which existed during this period contributed to
the confidence with which the United States was able to issue
this proclamation of hegemony--even at the end of the
nineteenth century, proximity to Western Hemisphere areas in
dispute afforded the United States significant strategic
advantages which were recognized by European powers.9
3. Isolationism in the Present
Modern technology has rendered geography meaningless,
in most respects. Strategic missiles are capable of striking
into the heart of any continent. Strategic bombers, with
inflight refueling support, can remain aloft for extended
periods. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers can carry an air
force larger than that possessed by some countries to almost
any location where saltwater washes sand. Geographic
isolation offers no defense anymore.
Economic isolation, if ever truly possible, is
equally defunct. Washington discounted the idea of economic
isolation when he said, "The great rule of conduct for us . .
is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them
as little political connection as possible"[emphasis
added]. 10 Washington recognized the reality of economic ties
and encouraged these within limits. The increasingly
9 Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, 2d ed. (New
York: Collier Books, 1962), 184-187.
10 Long, 24.
9
interconnected, and interdependent, modern global economy
belies the notion that any condition of economic isolation is
possible. The speed with which actions of dictators in the
Middle East can cause repercussions in the American economy
clearly demonstrates the reality of the global economy, as do
the economic difficulties in which a bastion of near-autarky-
-the communist economic system--finds itself today.
The early policies of the United States are still
referred to in debates concerning the course of American
foreign policy. Regardless of the full meaning of
Washington's address, his admonition against alliances has
been repeatedly read into the pages of the ConQressional
Record by advocates of American isolationism. During
hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948, C. P. Nettels,
a distinguished early American historian from Cornell
University, opposed the formation of the Atlantic alliance,
and suggested that Washington would be turning over in his
grave in reaction to the deviation from his "great rule of
conduct", as he referred to nonentanglement with Europe as
the oldest and most valuable American heritage.11
Opposing the isolationists were internationalists, of
either ilk, who saw in America's values the framework of a
system from which the entire world might benefit. The threat
of the totalitarian system which followed the bayonets of the
11 Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The
North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, 81st Cong., ist sess., Part
III, 1121.
10
Red Army, the lessons of Munich in 1938 and Berlin in 1948,
and the potential to create a new world order on the ashes of
the old after the "good war" of 1939-1945 compelled American
policy to take an interventionist turn following the Second
World War.12 America's ascent to the pinnacle of world power
brought with it a conviction that the U.S. system of ideals
and values were the best possible model for world order, and
an outward-oriented drive to communicate that system to the
world.
This paper will first discuss American isolationist
sentiment, and the actions of executive administrations in
countering that sentiment, during the pre-intervention
periods of World War I and World War II. These periods were
selected due to the intensity of the isolationist versus
internationalist debate occurring at the time. These
discussions will provide an historic backdrop for a
discussion of isolationism from the post-World War II, or
"Cold War", period to the present. The conclusion will
discuss the existence of conditions which have the potential
to contribute to a resurgence of isolationist sentiment.
The following pages suggest that isolationist
sentiment in the United States has passed through distinct
periods since the pre-intervention era of 1914 to 1917,
second; that each stage represents a metamorphosis worked by
12 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978), 117-125.
11
a severe external threat, and third; that the relaxation of
the threat resulted in a renascent,yet altered, condition of
isolationism. This study suggests an historical analysis of
isolationist sentiment during the pre-intervention periods of
the First and Second World Wars (1914 to 1917, and 1938 to
1941, respectively), and of the "Cold War" period (1945 to
1989), will contribute to understanding manifestations of
isolationist attitudes which have recently emerged as a
result of the diminution of the Soviet threat to American
interests.
12
II. WORLD WAR I
The outbreak of World War One found the United States
confident in the security of its position, both
geographically and politically. U.S. diplomatic influence
had achieved an apparent success by obtaining conditional
agreement to the "Open Door" policy in China in 1901, and
through that success had demonstrated the principles upon
which the United States intended to base its foreign
diplomacy. The U.S. Navy's success in countering the Spanish
fleet during the Spanish-American war of 1897, and a great
expanse of deep water which insulated the American continent,
combined to create the impression of great security.
The Monroe Doctrine expressed popular American sentiment
regarding the European powers, and the Venezuelan crisis in
1902 provided the opportunity for the the U. S. government to
demonstrate its allegiance to the principles of the Monroe
Doctrine by taking action to defend its interests in the
Western Hemisphere. The joint punitive expedition undertaken
by Germany and Britain in 1902 against the dictatorship in
Venezuela was initially unopposed by the U.S. administration
on the understanding that no "lasting" occupation of
Venezuelan territory was intended by the allied powers. The
U.S. was later forced to reverse its position by popular
opposition to the apparent violation of the Monroe Doctrine,
13
and by concerns that the German government intended to
challenge the Monroe Doctrine by acquiring territory in Latin
America, from where it could potentially threaten the eastern
approaches to the future Panamanian canal.
Germany's desires in the Western Hemisphere caused
suspicions in the United States. The German efforts at
Venezuela were apparently held in check by the threatening
mobilization of Admiral Dewey's fleet in the Caribbean,
Admiral von Tirpitz's interest in acquiring the Danish West
Indies for a German naval base lent impetus to the American
decision to buy the islands from Denmark, and the growing
German navy was viewed by American naval advocates as the
foremost challenge to U.S. interests. U.S. efforts regarding
the Open Door policy and China in the Far East represented,
to German leaders, the desertion of the isolationist doctrine
by the United States, and nurtured their ambition to further
defy U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
13
The principles contained in the Monroe Doctrine and the
Caribbean Policy, which recognized the strategic importance
of the isthmian canal and sought to protect U.S. access and
13 This brief discussion of American diplomatic history
is based largely upon Samuel Flagg Bemis, The United States
as a World Power: A Diplomatic History. 1900-1955) (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1955), and is intended to present a
background on general issues which shaped American foreign
policies shortly before World War One. Holger H. Herwig also
discusses German-American rivalries during the late
eighteenth and early twentieth centuries in Politics of
Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning,
1889-1941 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), 13-106.
14
control of the waterway, largely illustrates the widespread
attitude in the United States prior to World War One. Except
for disparate occasions when American influence was exerted
to further the principles of democracy and sovereignty, as in
the Open Door policy, successive administrations adhered to
the concept of the United States being an inviolable
sanctuary from the caprices of European politics, and quite
capable of enforcing the Western Hemisphere's freedom from
intrusions by the established powers of Europe.
14
The attitude of being hegemonic in the Western Hemisphere
and disassociated from events in Europe continued to dominate
American political thought into the twentieth century.
Popular American awareness of the capabilities of U.S.
influence was not matched by an awareness of the degree to
which that influence was interwoven with the powers of
Europe--a point best illustrated by President W. Wilson in
May, 1916 when he stated, regarding the objects and causes of
the war, "we are not concerned. The obscure foundations from
which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not
interested to search for or explore."'15 Former U.S.
ambassador G. F. Kennan discusses the widespread American
sentiment that the European war was a natural result of the
14 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1984), xi.
15 Address by Woodrow Wilson to the First Annual
Assemblage of the League To Enforce Peace, 27 May 1916, cited
by Kennan, 63.
15
complicated politics and inter-governmental rivalries of the
Continent, all of which were of no concern to the United
States--in his words, Americans dismissed the "real interests
and aspirations of other peoples . . . as unsubstantial and
unworthy of our attention, as 'jealousies and rivalries' too
silly, too 'complicated,' to deserve our respect."'
16
The American public was generally unaware of the causes
of the war. The New York Times announced the beginning of
the war with headlines which stated Germany had declared war
on Russia, and France was mobilizing and might be drawn in
later. The causes were simplified to indicate a wanton
Austrian attack upon 'little Servia' [sic], and editorials
pointed to Germany's failure to restrain its ally as a clear
indication of a deeper 'Teutonic scheme'. The 'democracy
versus imperialism' concept of the war's roots supported the
moral verdict imposed by popular opinion, and Britain's
ultimatum to Germany on 03 August seemed to vindicate the
propriety of popular U.S. opinion.l
The confluence of Anglo-American opinion had been
heightened by British support for the United States against
what was viewed by the Wilson administration as a European
plot instigated by Germany. The Anglo-German naval rivalry
during the early 20th century gave rise to the American
belief that Britain and the United States, which was being
pressed by German interests in Latin America, shared a common
16 Kennan, 63-64.
16
rival in Germany. Another significant contribution to the
shaping of American opinion at the beginning of the war was
Britain's control over the news. Cutting the German trans-
Atlantic cables within the first week of the war placed
Britain in the enviable position of controlling the vast
majority of European news at a time when the world was
defining the issues and assigning war guilt. As general
disinterest touirds any European affair which did not
directly impinge upon American interests limited most
Americans' abilities to formulate balanced judgements
regardinig responsibility for the war, popular American
opinion proved to be a blank slate which was receptive to
manipulation by groups which sought to further their specific
schemes.
American naivete' regarding European politics also
supported the Wilson administration's commitment to
maintaining U.S. neutrality as the major powers in
continental Europe staggered into war during the final half
of 1914. Alliances which were both secret and overt, and
real and implied, ensnared the democracies and the dynasties,
bound them one to the other, and pulled them all over the
precipice. These countries hurtled down into the maelstrom
of a war which whirled ever faster and ever more violently as
17 Walter Millis, Road to War: America 1914 to 1917
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1935), 42-56; and Ernest
R. May, The World War and American Isolation (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1959), 38-49.
17
it approached the totality which Clausewitz declared was the
nature of all wars.
The foreign policies of Wilson's administration were
primarily coicerned with defining and protecting the status
of America's neutrality during the pre-intervention period,
which lasted from August, 1914 until April, 1917, and his re-
election during this period presents evidence of popular
support for this policy. As the Continent's war endured
longer than many had supposed possible, and as the war
validated Clausewitz by its expansion, the issues of
neutrality became more critical. The support or sympathy of
neutral countries offered belligerents the ability to deepen
their strategic base18 by serving as a source of supply for
war materiel, foodstuffs, and other consumables upon which
both the armies and the populations of the warring countries
depended.
The Wilson administration's failure to recognize the
degree to which U.S. interests were bound up with those of
Europe, and subsequent failure to actively define (or lack of
willingness to support) the policies of American neutrality
accordingly, gradually eliminated the policy options
18 The term 'strategic base' is used here to refer to
the support structure which connects a country at war to its
soldiers. A strategic base might include, but is not
necessarily limited to: popular support, industrial
production, political support, agricultural production, and
other diverse means by which a country concentrates,
orchestrates, and focuses its potentials into a violent
expression of will.
18
available to the U.S. If Wilson or his advisors had
recognized the degree to which the Entente powers would bind
American interests to the success of the Entente, the
policies of neutrality might have been more decidedly
neutral, even to the point of accepting less economic growth
for the purpose of protecting that neutrality. As it was,
the Wilson administration became increasingly pressed to
define U.S. neutrality in ways which benefitted the Entente
in order to support the interests of the United States,
although those definitions marked the path to war. These
conditions combined to ensure that American intervention was
inevitable.
A. MAKERS OF WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY
The sources of American foreign policy during the early
part of the war were shaped less by public opinion or
intelligence reports than by the "consciences and notions of
duty and national interest" of the Secretary of State, the
Counselor of the Department of State, Wilson's personal
friend and advisor, and Wilson himself. This structure for
formulating American policies regarding neutrality issues
presented many opportunities for personal convictions to
unduly influence the ultimate course which U.S. policy was to
take. As the administration's policies affecting neutrality
developed, the United States was incrementally drawn into
closer association with the members of the Entente Cordiale
(Britain and France), until war with the members of the Dual
19
Alliance (The German and Austro-Hungarian Empires) became
unavoidable.
Kennan refers to the manner in which American leaders
shaped U.S. neutrality policies to benefit the Entente
powers, and credits the policy-makers of Wilson's
administration with the foresight to have recognized the
danger which a German victory over Britain would have posed
to American interests. 19 This hypothesis is credible,
especially in light of the tensions which existed between the
United States and Germany during the first part of the
twentieth century--as previously discussed, Germany had
coveted areas in Latin America, which might have potentially
threatened the planned trans-isthmian canal. Additionally,
Germany's efforts at colonial expansion directly challenged
American expansion in Samoa, the Phillipines, and West Indies
during the 1890's and 1900's. The strained relations between
the two powers grew until Germany was viewed, by many
American statesmen and military leaders, as the only possible
opponent with which the United States might have to
contend.20 The natural rivalry between these two growing
powers lent to the suspcions each held for the other's
intents.
19 Kennan, 64-66.
20 Herwig, 13-106, presents an excellent and thorough
discussion of the strained relations between the United
States and Germany during this period.
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.. Robert Lansing
The policy-making apparatus in the Wilson
administration was, at the outbreak of the war, embodied in
the Counselor of the Department of State (an office roughly
comparable to the present Under-Secretary of State), Robert
Lansing. The sudden death of Wilson's wife inflicted a
grievous shock on the president at a time when his leadership
was most required for shaping American opinion and policies,
and when Wilson appealed to the American people for their
assistance in "maintaining a state of neutrality during the
present European war" on 19 August, it was already too
late.21 The decidedly pro-Entente slant given to the
majority of the news coming into the United States from
Europe ensured that although the majority of Americans
strongly supported neutrality, their sympathies were with the
Entente.22
Prior to his service in Wilson's administration,
Lansing was a New York lawyer with a reputation as a scholar
in the field of international law. These characteristics of
his background, plus his association with former Secretary of
State J. W. Foster (as the former Secretary's son-in-law)
placed Lansing among the East Coast elite who were heavily
exposed to British influences. Lansing saw diplomacy's
21 Millis, 57-58.
22 Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United
States and World War I. 1914-1920 (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1965), 3-5.
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purpose as being to uphold the law and to support the
interests of American business, and these motives were
reflected in his decisions during the first part of the war.
Wilson soon recognized the potential importance of
American policy decisions and began to exercise increasing
control over those decisions. Lansing continued to provide
policy advice to the president, and after Bryan resigned in
mid-1915, Lansing was appointed to the office of Secretary of
State.23 While he was pro-Entente at the outset, Lansing
became increasingly so as the war endured--a diary entry made
by Lansing in September, 1916, illustrates his perception of
appropriate U.S. foreign policy goals;
Nothing in our controversies with Great Britain must
be brought to a head. We must keep on exchanging notes
because if we do not we will have to take radical
measures. . .
Nothing can move me from my fixed purpose to remain
on friendly terms with Great Britain. I only hope that
the President will adopt the true policy which is "Join
23 May, 48-49. May points to the bombing of Antwerp,
and the subsequent issue of what would constitute an
appropriate U.S. response to the German violation of an open
city, as an identifiable turning point for the Wilson
administration. Prior to this point the Counselor of the
Department of State, Robert Lansing, was largely responsible
for formulating U.S. foreign policy for the Wilson
administration in regard to the belligerents participating in
the European war. The President settled a dispute between
Lansing and Bryan concerning the U.S. response to the
bombing, and afterwards, Wilson apparently recognized the
potential for long-range implications of American policy, and
became increasingly involved in foreign affairs, and the
question of neutrality.
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the Allies as soon as possible and crush the German
Autocrats." If he takes drastic mesures against Great
Britain, he will never be forgiven 
....
2. Edward X. House
Edward M. House was another presidential advisor who
championed the Entente's cause. An unofficial advisor to the
President, House held a more Continental view of the balance
of power than advisors in Wilson's administration, and
believed U.S. interests would be best served by preserving
Britain's friendship and enlarging the relative power and
influence of the United States. House embraced a balance of
power vision which was different from the views of Lansing--
Lansing's support for pro-Entente policies seems to have been
guided by economic and legal considerations--since Britain
and France were America's best customers, policy decisions
which supported commerce with them must have seemed the
proper course, especially when those decisions were legally
justifiable. House, in contrast, viewed rivalries and
conflicts as inherent to international relations. He
regarded the balance of power in Europe and the coincidence
of British and American interests as essential for the
protection of the United States in particular, and the West
in general, and feared antagonism between Russia and the West
24 From a diary entry dated 30 September, 1916,
contained in Foreign Relations of the United States: The
Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, National Archives, Washington,
D.C., vol. I, 131; cited in May, 332. Millis, and Arthur S.
Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign
Policies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), also
refer to Lansing's personal support for Great Britain.
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if Germany was unable to provide a protective barrier.
American interests, in House's mind, would have justified an
Anglo-American alliance at the very beginning of the war.
That there were similarities between the views held
by House and those held by Lansing, however, is illustrated
by a diary entry made by House in November, 1916,
We not only have foreign countries to deal with, but the
President must be guided. . . . His tendency to offend
the Allies . . . is likely to lead us into trouble with
them. If we are to have war, let it be with Germany by
all means.
25
Thus a coincidence of opinion existed between House and
Lansing. Both exerted great influence on Wilson's policy
decisions, and as a result it was likely that the United
States would, when faced with a decisions which could not
avoid adversely affecting the goals of one set of
belligerents or the other, shape that decision to support the
Entente and justify it in the name of American neutrality.
3. William J. Bryan
William J. Bryan was possibly the most decidedly
neutral of Wilson's policy advisors, although his role ended
with his resignation in mid-1915. He was an fervent
supporter of disarmament and arbitration, and argued strongly
for measures through which America might be protected from
involvement in the European war. Bryan saw as his primary
objective regarding the war the prevention of its spread,
25 House Papers, diary entry date 17 November 1916,
cited in May, 333.
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especially to America. He hoped to prevent public sympathies
from being too closely attached to either alliance, and
personally conducted negotiations to keep German radio
stations in America operating during the pre-intervention
period. An ardent advocate of avoiding the slightest
semblance of alignment, Bryan supported the strictest
interpretations of neutrality. His resignation in mid-1915
came, however, after a dispute over policy with Lansing
regarding neutrality was decided against him by Wilson,




As the final step in policy formulation, Wilson's
opinions were the most critical for the foreign policy
process. He was viewed by House as being 'one of the most
contradictory characters in history,' a reference made to the
many paradoxes which shaped his character and outlook.
Generally accepted, however, is the importance of moralism in
Wilson's approach to all issues--any policy decision was
weighed carefully against Wilson's conception of justice and
propriety. But peace did not necessarily outweigh national
interests for Wilson. He stated, during a speech in Kansas
during February, 1916, that "There is a moral obligation laid
upon us to keep out of this war if possible. But by the same
26 Merle E. Curti, Bryan and World Peace (Northampton,
MA: 1931); cited by May, 37-38.
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token there is a moral obligation laid upon us to keep free
the courses of our commerce and of our finance." Wilson may
have weighed policy alternatives for their "rightness', but
political and economic considerations found their way onto
his scales as well. He was generally not given to policies
which were speculative or slow-working, but often pressed for
immediate and ideal solutions. The degree to which Wilson
allowed Lansing to shape policy during the initial part of
the war was an aberration--Wilson's demonstrated view of the
presidential role in making foreign policy had previously
been almost autocratic, as with the Mexican crisis from March
1913 until the outbreak of World War One.
27
5. Public Opinion
The American public was, as stated above, generally
isolationist. Although sympathetic to the cause of the
Entente, American sympathy did not translate into
interventionism; millions of Americans were immigrants or
first-generation Americans and either cherished (or hated)
their country of origin sufficiently to wish it well (or ill)
27 This discussion of Wilson and his closest advisors is
drawn largely from May, 37-47, 54-61, 63-64, 73, 75, 146-
150, 157, 172-178, 241, 367-368; Millis, 10, 22-27, 44-45,
48, 77-80, 87-89, 106-107, 196, 222, 228, 262-265, 329-334;
Smith, 2, 16-18, 24-27, 33-34, 44, 47-49, 58-59, 72-74, 76-
79; Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of
Power (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1955) also
discusses the structure of the Wilson administration's
policy-making apparatus. Wilson's character is further
discussed by Link, and by Barbara W. Tuchman, "Can History
Use Freud? The Case of Woodrow Wilson," The Atlantic 219:2
(February 1967): 41-44.
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in the war, but not sufficiently to spill their own blood in
its cause.
Geographically, internationalism tended to be
concentrated in the northeastern United States, especially
near the population centers, with isolationism becoming more
predominant as the distance from the eastern seaboard
increased. Idustrialized areas tended to be more
internationalist than rural areas, and education lent itself
to developed internationalist perspectives. American opinion
was not generally united until March, 1917, when the
publication of German Foreign Minister Dr. A. Zimmermann's
suggestion to Mexico that a German-Mexican alliance against
the United States would be rewarded by Mexico's retrieving
portions of the United States which it had formerly
possessed. The widespread furor which greeted the
dissemination of Dr. Zimmermann's communication with the
Mexican government arguably united American opinion against
Wilhelmian Germany more than any other single event--before
the telegram was revealed, interventionist sentiment was
largely concentrated in the eastern United States.
Afterward, the southern and western parts of the country
became more prominently anti-Germany.
28
28 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1944), 1-11, presents a
concise discussion of American public opinions preceding
American intervention in World War I. May and Millis touch
on the subject as well.
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To develop a better understanding of the issues which
concerned the public and the Wilson administration prior to
American participation in World War I, this paper will
organize the issues into two broad areas. The first will be
issues which address American commerce, both with the Entente
powers, and with those of the Alliance. The second area will
address shipping issues, and will discuss Wilson's policies
regarding the defense of American shipping rights, and toward
Germany in response to that country's declaration of
unlimited submarine warfare.
B. NEUTRALITY ISSUES
Two inter-related areas form the basis for discussing
American policies during the pre-intervention period of the
United States. The first area concerns the issues of
commerce. Early on, the Wilson administration decided to
allow the free export of war materiel from America, which
benefitted the Entente considerably more than it did the
Alliance. Another issue in this area lent further support to
the munitions trade--Wilson modified a previously strict
policy which restricted extending credit to the European
belligerents. Allowing American capital to be made available
to Britain and France supported the Entente's war effort.
Although technically within the bounds of legality and
precedent, these policies contributed to the Anglo-American
community of interest, and restricted the latitude available
to Wilson in his foreign policy decisions.
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The second area of neutrality issues in which American
policies generally favored the Entente is that of shipping
interests. During the pre-intervention period, Wilson's
defense of American neutrality regarding these issues formed
the basis for American relations with the European
belligerents. The ramifications of selectively supporting
issues which affected U.S. neutrality ultimately resulted in
a declaration of war by the United States against the German
Empire. The unequal response of the Wilson administration
to violations of neutral shipping rights established the
chain of events which determined American intervention in the
war.
This chapter will discuss the Wilson administration's
policies in the two areas outlined above, and how those
policies supported of France and Britain, to the detriment of
the interests of the German and the Austro-Hungarian Empires.
Modifying or selectively applying policies in the above-
mentioned areas enabled Wilson's administration to shape U.S.
neutrality to make it more supportive of American aims, with
the result of drawing the United States into the European
war.
C. COMMERCE ISSUES
1. The Arms Trade
The dependence of the Entente upon U.S.-manufactured
war supplies was exceeded only by the willingness of the
Wilson administration to allow the export of arms and
29
ammunition destined for the French and British armies. An
arms embargo, similar to embargoes which were enacted by
other neutral countries, might have been more supportive of
strict neutrality, but it would not have supported American
economic growth. This combination of dependence and interests
gave rise to the war materiel trade which developed between
the neutral United States and the Entente members.
Ironically, the political interest of the United
States in allowing the arms trade to flourish was grounded in
Wilson's desires for disarmament after the war's end. Wilson
feared cutting off the supply of weapons to France and
Britain would send an irrefutable signal that failing to
maintain a high degree of military preparedness during
peacetime could be a potentially fatal error. Lansing also
advocated tolerance of the arms trade by advising Wilson that
not only was such trade lawful, but to interfere with it
would have been contrary to international practice.30 The
British ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil Spring
Rice, was aware of Wilson's vision of the U.S. playing a
leading role in achieving world disarmament, and aided his
country's cause by suggesting to British Foreign Minister Sir
Edward M. Grey that if Wilson supported such an embargo, it
9 Lansing Papers, I, 124-125, cited by May, 48-49.
30 Lansing Papers, I, 124-125, cited by May, 48-49.
30
could disqualify the American administration from the role of
impartial mediator.
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The rationalization that interfering wit- the export
of munitions could be considered a gesture of support for the
militaristic Alliance against the democratic Entente
gratified Wilson's concern for the morality of allowing such
exports to continue. Predictably, this justification was
supported by Alliance sympathizers, and American
industrialists who were benefitting from weapons contracts.
32
Wilson found further moral vindication in the sentiment that
the U.S. policy allowed any country to purchase American
munitions and only a chance of fate had created the
conditions which precluded the members of the Alliance from
ensuring the shipping communications which would have made
the U.S. arsenal available to them, whereas Britain's command
of the sea lanes helped ensure a steady communication of
supplies from the United States.33 This moral justification
of America's willingness to sell arms to the Alliance powers
was supported by Germany's ready acceptance of the Wilson
31 Millis, 58.
32 Millis, 99-101.
33 Literary DiQest, XLIX (19 December 1914): 1208; cited
by May, 48. The implications of U.S. acquiescence to
Britain's command of the sea lanes is yet another issue,
which will be discussed below--at this point, it is
sufficient to note that U.S. interpretations of shipping
issues greatly aided Britain's domination of the Atlantic
while impeding the Alliance's efforts to gain access to U.S.-
manufactured war materiel.
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administration's arms trade policy during the early part of
the war, although the German government contended (once the
war had become mired in the trenches in 1915), that American
arms were prolonging the war by supplying munitions to the
Entente.34
Economic interests also pressured Wilson into
countenancing the munitions trade. Wilson emphasized, during
his 1912 campaign for the presidency, his concern regarding
the dangers recession and stagnation held for to the American
economy, if industrial exports were not increased.35 Being
then confronted with conditions which had the potential to be
extremely favorable to U.S. economic growth, Wilson's courage
in initially discouraging Americans from garnering profits
from the Europeans' horrors must be acknowledged, but the
benefits of the war for the U.S. economy must also be
acknowledged. Entente orders for explosives, as an example,
increased from $2.8 million, during March, 1915 to $32.2
million during November of the same year. American
business interests welcomed the opportunity to expand their
34 May, 47.
35 John Wells Davidson, ed., A Cross Roads of Freedom,
The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson, cited by N.
Gordon Levin Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:
America's Response to War and Revolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1968), 14-16.
6 Charles C. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1938), 139-140.
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production, and eventually became dependent upon the
Entente's war orders.
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The timing of the war's outbreak and the resulting
growth in exports was fortuitous for American economic
interests. The balance of trade stood heavily against the
United States in mid-1914, and an estimated $250 million in
credits were to fall due in London by the end of the year.
The war interrupted U.S. agricultural exports, which would
normally have offset the trade imbalance, and bro",i t about
an urgent necessity to establish a flow of exports to
Europe,38 which was answered by Britain's need for war
materiel. 
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Sir George Paish and Basil B. Blackett,
representatives of the British Treasury, worsened the anxiety
of American bankers in October, 1914, by indicating that
37 Harold C. Syrett, "The Business Press and American
Neutrality, 1914-1917," The Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 32:2 (September 1945): 217-218.
38 Joseph V. Fuller, "The Genesis of the Munitions
Traffic," Journal of Modern History 6:3 (September 1934):
283-284.
39 Grey noted in his memoirs that these supplies were
"necessary to carry on the war at all with any chance of
success" in Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Years,
1892-1916 (New York: 1925, vol. II, 107; cited by Fuller,
280. May, 320-322, shows that by the end of 1916, however,
British concerns regarding the possibility of an American
arms embargo had compelled them to take steps to mitigate the
dangers such action would have presented, steps which
included distributing munitions orders to other countries
(such as Canada), and building factories in England for the
purpose of making muritions. May argues that by the
beginning of 1917 ar American munitions embargo would have
been inconvenient, but not disastrous.
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British financial interests expected the $250 million in
obligations to be paid in full. Paish did not offer any plan
for extending the obligation, nor did he forecast any means
by which the stagnant agricultural market could be improved;
instead he offered the suggestion that the trade imbalance
would be resolved by the end of the year due to the
increasing British demand for war materiel, even to the point
of the United States becoming a creditor nation. As the
trade developed, Britain bound American industry even more
tightly to interdependence by tying the availability of raw
materials (especially wool and some alloys of steel) which
were needed by American industries to fill war orders to
assurances that neither the raw materials, nor articles
containing them, would be re-exported to the enemies of the
Entente. 40
American interpretations of neutrality regarding
munitions trade created a strong tie which bound American
interests to the Entente. Exporting munitions and military
stores boosted American industry and alleviated fears that
British financiers would call due notes which could ruin
American bankers. Paish represented his country's interests
well by first playing upon the fears of the bankers, and then
offering the temptation of financial gains exceeding the
simple repayment of debt. Earlier predictions by
industrialists had foreseen no gains beyond those accrued
40 Fuller, 288-292.
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from trade which would normally have gone to the
belligerents; the opportunity to benefit from the war needs
of the Entente was a welcome surprise to American business.
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Since American sympathies were already largely pro-Entente,
the lure of financial gains under the cloak of legality which
had been bestowed by Lansing virtually guaranteed that any
effort to restrict the export of war materiel to Europe would
be met with grave resistance from two quarters--on one hand,
industrialists and financiers would not be likely to remain
silent while restrictions were placed on opportunities to
garner profits from a great demand for goods and financial
capital. On another, Entente supporters would be equally as
unlikely to forego the opportunity to enlist the
industrialists and financiers to support their own agenda.
Two efforts to impose an arms embargo did occur,
however. The first was forwarded by pro-German interests and
succeeded in placing bills to restrict arms exports before
Congress during late 1914. Wilson's and Lansing's reviews of
the export policy revealed the degree to which such an
embargo would affect the economic interests of the United
States, and even the normally pacifist Bryan believed arms
exports should be continued, writing that,
. . . any action looking to interference [sic] with the
right of belligerents to buy arms here would be construed
as an unneutral act, not only because the effect of such
41 Syrett, 217.
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action would be to assist one party at the expense of the
other, but also because the purpose of the resolution is
plainly to assist one party at the expense of the other.42
The second attempt to impose an arms embargo occurred
during early 1916, but achieved even less success than its
predecessor. Nor would it have had the import of the earlier
embargo attempt. A critical shortage of shells in 1915,
combined with London's need to ensure an adequate shell
supply, even in the face of a vengeful United States, had
moved Lloyd George to concentrate on building munitions
factories in the United Kingdom, and to transfer some
munitions orders to Canada. An American embargo in 1916
might have caused a more frugal munitions policy and some
inconvenience, but it would not have been disastrous.43
Had the United States wielded its advantage in arms
production more skillfully earlier in the war, Britain would
have been more responsive to the issues of American
neutrality rights, and conceded the rights of American
vessels to conduct trade in non-contraband goods with the
Alliance powers. This trade, in turn, could have mitigated
pressures within the Imperial German government to conduct
unrestricted submarine warfare. While any discussion of
historical events is shrouded in afterthought and second-
guessing, some evidence points to the German government's
decision to resume aggressive submarine patrols as a measure
42 May, 47-49.
43 May, 44-45, 189-190, 320-322.
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taken in response to British efforts to isolate Germany
economically as much as to inhibit the Entente's access to
war supplies. Wilson's policy decisions in regard to the
issue of the arms trade, therefore, were too late and too
conservative to achieve the intended purpose of protecting
American neutrality. The earlier decision to protect
America's economic recovery through allowing the arms trade
to continue was also counter-productive in the long term, as
it almost guaranteed American vessels would become targets
for German torpedoes.
2. Financial Issues
Bryan's early efforts to ensure the United States
would not be drawn into the European conflict moved him to
advocate strict interpretations of non-involvement, and he
approached Wilson during the first month of the war to
persuade the president to discourage U.S. banks from lending
money to the belligerents, a position which Wilson
supported.44 Bryan's reasoning was flawless--financial
interest in the outcome of the war would virtually guarantee
U.S. citizens would attempt to exert their influence on
American involvement and threaten what he perceived as the
preeminent goal of U.S. policy--to avoid involvement in the
war.45 The availability of U.S. financial capital might have
" Smith, 34-35.
45 From a memorandum from Bryan to Wilson, 10 August
1914, contained in Lansing Papers, 131-132, cited by May, 38.
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mattered little had the war been as short as most observers
supposed it was to have been. As the war continued, the
Entente's increasing dependence on American goods exhausted
their available supply of dollar credits, and the Wilson
administration came to realize that the Entente would not be
able to continue purchasing American goods without financial
assistance. 46
As stated previously, Wilson was aware of the
financial benefits which the United States, suffering from a
recession, would accrue from business with the European
belligerents. His initial efforts to define the boundaries
of American neutrality somewhat belies the 'economics
conspiracy' theory as a rational explanation for U.S.
involvement,47 as does his request for authority from
Congress to restrict commerce with the Entente in retaliation
for British transgressions against American trading
interests.48 Had Wilson intended to involve the United
States in the European war from the outset, restricting U.S.
support for the Entente countries at any point would have
been clearly contrary to U.S. interests. As previously
46 May, 43-48.
47 Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy DurinQ the World
War (Baltimore: Little, Brown and Co., 1934), 118, cites the
proceedings of the Nye Committee to support his arguments
against Wilson being coerced, convinced, or duped into
involving the United States in the war for economic reasons,
as does May, 195.
48 Seymour, 53-55.
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discussed, while his advisors might have been unabashedly
pro-Entente, Wilson exerted enormous influence in America's
policy towards the belligerent European powers; actions taken
by Wilson to chastise the Entente cannot be discounted.
Financial issues, therefore, are not the issues which
ensured U.S. intervention on behalf of the Entente, but the
financial and commercial ties between the United States and
the Entente members can be argued to have been conducive to,
and illustrative of, the conditions which ultimately led to a
confrontation between the United States and Germany. The
ties are illustrative in the sense that they demonstrate how
American neutral policies were favorable to the Entente.
They were conducive to the conditions precipitating the
confrontation in that increased Anglo-American trade, in
combination with restricted trade between America and
Germany, could not have avoided creating beliefs among both
belligerents, and non-belligerents, that the interests of the
United States were more in line with those of the Entente
than with those of the Alliance.
The rapid develcpment of the American war industry
made the issue of loans to the belligerents moot. Although
Lansing is indicated as the origin of the proposal that
Wilson modify his earlier decision regarding loans to the
European belligerents, even the strictly neutral Bryan
recognized the degree to which continuing the loan ban could
39
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impair the U.S. economy. U.S. Treasury Secretary William
G. McAdoo emphasized the restrictive nature of the loan ban
by writing to Wilson that the members of the Entente would be
unable to pay for American exports without depleting their
gold reserves and precipitating a general bankruptcy unless
access to large loans was granted. Bankruptcy on the part of
the Entente would then have caused, in Lansing's words,
"restriction of outputs, industrial depression, idle capital,
financial demoralization, and general unrest and suffering
among the laboring classes. ''50 A means by which to allow
American bankers to operate around the ban was therefore
needed.
The loan ban was ameliorated by a politically savvy
maneuver. Lansing composed a memorandum which removed
commercial loans from the purview of the ban, and signed it
after Wilson had approved the text. Although the memorandum
had been approved by the president, it was exhibited to
financiers privately and contained the disclaimer,
The above are my [Lansing's] individual impressions of
the conversation with the President, who authorized me to
49 May, 40-46, supports the argument that Lansing was
not ardently pro-ally, but was instead concerned primarily
with the legal implications of U.S. neutrality, particularly
regarding claims for post-war settlements, and secondly with
advancing economic growth for the United States, where such
growth did not conflicL with American neutrality. A key
point Lansing used to persuade Wilson to allow loans to be
made to Britain was that the Entente would simply take their




give them to such persons as were entitled to hear them,
upon the express understanding that they were my own
impressions and that I had no authority to speak for the
President or the Government.
51
This method of abrogating the conditions of the loan ban
enabled the administration to deny that any change had taken
place, when in actuality the original prohibition had been
significantly diluted. The loan ban modification was
advantageous to both alliances--the Germans were also
seeking financing for their war effort--but equally so. The
Entente would have been placed in a difficult position
without American dollar credits for continuing the arms trade
with the United States.
5 2
The importance of financial support for Britain is
demonstrated by the trade deficit which developed. Having
already borrowed nearly $2 billion in the United States by
the end of 1916, British Treasury representatives were
engaged in an effort to secure further American loans solely
on the strength of the British government's credit, to cover
a projected need for nearly $10 million per day in American
imports. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George viewed
U.S. financial support as sufficiently important to express
concerns in November, 1916 about the war's lack of progress
51 Memo by Lansing, 23 October 1914, Lansing Papers, I,
140, cited in May, 46.
52 May, 44-48.
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possibly impairing American willingness to extend credit to
Britain.
53
Commerce issues remained undiminished in importance
throughout the pre-intervention period. The ability to
sustain large armies in the field caused the European
belligerents to become heavily dependent upon their strategic
bases to continue the war, and U.S. production of war
materiel made the United States a critical portion of the
strategic base of the alliance which could influence American
behavior, and as a result America found itself in the
position of being subjected to the efforts of both alliances
to reduce the strategic base of the other at the same time
the Wilson administration was trying to define its neutrality
policies to serve what it believed to be American interests.
The commerce issues discussed above illustrate how
Britain succeeded in progressively coopting American support.
Lloyd George's acknowledgement of Britain's early dependence
upon U.S.-manufactured materiel demonstrates that the English
recognized the importance of American support, as does Grey's
early efforts to maintain good relations with the Wilson
administration.54 After the war had settled into stalemate
and foreign financing became essential to continue the war,
53 May, 323-333.
54 May, pp. 8-33, and Millis, pp. 29-30, both discuss
the efforts of Grey to maintain Anglo-American relations in
the best possible state through the early months of the war,
even in the face of opposition from other British government
officials.
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the Anglo-American commercial ties placed the Wilson
administration in an increasingly untenable position. Any
action against the Entente would impair U.S. economic
interests and alienate Entente sympathizers and commercial
interests simultaneously.
D. SHIPPING ISSUES
Both alliances recognized the supply lines which crossed
the Atlantic were primary targets for interdiction. These
powers sought to control these lines through the best methods
available to them. The methods through which the
belligerents sought to control the Atlantic lines of
communication, and the interpretation of American neutrality
issues regarding those methods, constitute the shipping
issues of the pre-intervention period.
The Wilson administration's inclination to shape American
neutrality through policies which supported the Entente's
interests, and the resulting merger of American interests
with the Entente's clearly reduced the administration's
ability to respond appropriately to infractions of U.S.
neutrality rights. As the economic well-being of the United
States became dependent upon Entente war orders, Britain
became increasingly able to assert the terms under which
shipping operated, and did so with increasing emphasis on
wartime expediency and with decreasing regard for U.S.
interests. Wilson recognized the degree to which American
interests were being compromised, but U.S. ties to Britain
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and the Entente supported policy decisions which avoided
confrontation with the Entente powers.
After the war, Colonel House voiced the opinion that,
except for more serious transgressions which were perpetrated
against U.S. interests by Germany, conditions might have
developed which would have made it impossible for the United
States to avoid war with Britain. Britain's efforts to
blockade Germany, and to extend that blockade to the maximum
depth possible, repeatedly encroached upon American neutral
rights.55 Avoiding direct confrontation with Britain
regarding American shipping interests enhanced Britain's
position. The degree of support contributed by the U.S. to
the Entente, combined with the increased effectiveness which
Britain's breaches of international law afforded Britain's
extended cordon, provided the impetus for Germany to
retaliate with the most effective naval weapon it could
employ at the time. The submarine, in its turn, brought the
United States fully and finally into the war.
The subject of shipping issues contains four general
areas. The first three areas address British ccntrol of
supply lines through methods which included mining,
contraband definitions, and blacklists, and how U.S.
reactions to the British efforts to control shipping failed
55 Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and the
Blacklist During The Great War," Journal of Modern History
6:1 (March 1934): 14-16. The specific issues which comprise
the British violations are discussed in a later part of this
chapter.
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to demonstrate commitment to upholding the avowed neutrality
rights of the United States. The British decision to
interdict all supplies going to Germany regardless of the
contraband status strengthened the arguments of Germany's
submarine warfare advocates and ensured the confrontation
between Germany and the United States. The fourth area
addresses the submarine issue, and will discuss how rigid
U.S. reactions to unrestricted submarine warfare created the
conditions which ultimately mandated American involvement in
World War One.
1. Mining
Shortly after the war's beginning, Britain claimed
Germany had violated international law by planting prohibited
mines in the North Sea. Germany's denial of having
technically violated the law, and the non-committal response
of the United States, encouraged an ascendent spiral of
retaliatory measures against shipping which ultimately
escaped the Wilson administration's ability to define and
enforce neutral policies which would have protected U.S.
interests. The proximate cause for American intervention
derived from this failure.
The mining of the North Sea in late 1914 was one of
the earliest measures of shipping control exercised by the
British. By declaring the North Sea a war zone, mining it,
and making ships' safe passage through the English channel
dependent upon embarking Admiralty pilots, Britain ensured no
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vessel could approach Scandinavian or German ports without
submitting to a search for contraband. May argues that
Britain's primary interest in mining the North Sea was
military--German submarines were damaging the British fleet,
and the British War Office feared a possible invasion--the
enhancement of the extended cordon was simply a beneficial
side-effect.56 The American government registered no
complaint when the mining was announced, largely because the
zone decree had virtually no effect on American interests.
Although international law was vague regarding the legality
of the British minefields, Wilson was predisposed to believe
that Anglo-American disputes were primarily over matters of
administration, not of principle, and felt confident in the
morality and legality of the British position.5
7
2. Contraband
The U.S. State Department received the first British
contraband list within a week of Britain's declaration of
war. Moved by what this portended for American interests,
the State Department reacted within hours by suggesting to
all belligerents that they abide by the Declaration of
London, an unratified agreement drafted in 1909 which
codified sea law in wartime.58 Committees composed of naval





officers and lawyers advised conditionally rejecting the
American proposition by proclaiming the Declaration to be in
effect, subject to certain modifications and exceptions. The
committees' decisions were heavily influenced by reports of
food and supplies being shipped into the neutral port of
Rotterdam, and thence on to the German army in Belgium--
accepting the Declaration as it had been drafted would have
made it impossible to stop these shipments.
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Codification of the Declaration of London might have
resolved numerous important shipping issues at the outset of
the war, but codification would also have eviscerated
Britain's extended cordon. May argues that the general
feeling in London supported the view that World War One would
be a short war, and therefore the expediency of interdicting
supply lines to the Alliance outweighed the military value of
American friendship. Domestic politics also precluded the
British government from accepting the Declaration.
Significant factions within the government had opposed it
during peacetime; to adopt it during war could result in the
overthrow of the government. Adopting the Declaration would
preclude the use of economics as a weapon for the British,
plus virtually guarantee that a portion of what they shipped
by sea would be returned at high velocity over the
battlefield. The matter was argued through proposals and
59 May, 16-17.
60 May, 18-20, 42-44.
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counter-proposals; Spring-Rice encouraged his government to
temporize, believing that the weight of American opinion and
Wilson's reluctance to employ extreme measures in retaliation
would reward patience. He was right--the final U.S. position
was to withdraw its demand for recognition of the Declaration
of London and replace it with the insistence that traditional
international law be recognized.
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Millis argues that international law was never
clearly violated by Britain, was simply modified to meet
Britain's needs. Since the majority of U.S. foreign trade at
the time was carried in British bottoms, these became, not
surprisingly, generally unavailable for trade with any powers
other than the Entente. Neutral shipping could not get
insurance with Lloyds, and the growing possibility of seizure
due to having violated British contraband lists further
increased the chances of a neutral shipper losing everything
on the high seas.
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Other writers take a different view. According to
recognized international law at the time, paper blockades
were illegal--a blockade had to be effectively maintained by
an adequate force for it to be binding--and even enemy goods
were safe on a neutral ship, if they were not contraband and
if they were not destined for a blockaded port. Absolute
contraband referred to goods exclusively use for war and
61 May, 20-25; Millis, 53, 83, 88-90.
62 Millis, 83-85.
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destined for an enemy country, even if passing through a
neutral port (the rule of "continuous voyage"). Conditional
contraband, in contrast, referred to goods which may have a
peaceful use but which were also susceptible of use in war
and which were destined for the armed forces or a government
department of a belligerent state (the rule of continuous
voyage did not apply).63
If Britain applied traditional international law to
its dealings with neutral shipping, it was only in that
manner which suited British needs. The distinction between
conditional contraband and absolute contraband became blurred
and all but non-existent. Since a blockade was impossible
for the British to maintain effectively at the time, their
interpretation of the law allowed surveillance over all
neutral shipping the Royal Navy could interdict (the
"effective cordon"), presumed an enemy destination unless
otherwise proven, and disregarded the rule of continuous
voyage. This practice virtually assured, in concert with
British control of the sea lanes, Britain's ability to deter
commerce between the United States and Germany.
63 Edgar Turlington, Neutrality, Its History. Economics,
and Law (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1936), volume
3, The World War Period, with a preface by Philip C. Jessup,
cited by Bemis, 127-128.
64 Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Policy of the United
States Regarding the Declaration of London, At the Outbreak
of the Great War," Journal of Modern History 7:4 (December
1935): 434-447; also Bemis, 131-137.
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Britain also circumvented international law by
defining contraband to suit its needs. London was cautious
at first to avoid antagonizing the large section of American
opinion resident in the southeastern United States by
assigning cotton, tobacco, resin, or turpentine to its list
of conditional contraband, food was defined as conditional
contraband at the outset, and the previously mentioned items
were simply not accepted as cargo by any shippers wishing to
avoid the capriciousness of British prize courts. Senators
from southern states interceded with Bryan on behalf of their
constituents, but little was achieved; cotton was not on any
contraband list at the time, there was no clear violation of
law to protest, and within the U.S. there existed no
widespread support for the southerners' cause--the industrial
sections were strongly pro-Entente and dismissed the protests
as being the perennial concerns of the agrarian.65
The British did not actually seize foodstuffs being
shipped to the Alliance powers before March, 1915; Britain
effectively discouraged the export of foodstuffs bound for
Germany or for neutral Scandinavian countries by diverting
such shipments into British ports. An attempt to challenge
British policy during March, 1915 failed when the Wilhelmina,
an American ship manned by an American crew and flying an
American flag, attempted to carry food directly to Hamburg.
The ship's mission entailed more than commercial transport--
65 Millis, 83-87.
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it was intended as a test case to determine the rights of
neutrals to ship food directly to Germany. Delicately
balanced agreements which had been arranged between Bryan and
Grey prior to the ship's departure from Norfolk, Virginia
were toppled by an order issued by the German Federal Council
during the ship's transit. The Council's order complicated
the issue of defining contraband by ordering the seizure of
all corn, wheat, and flour in the German Empire. The British
considered her cargo contraband, despite German assurances
that the cargo would be distributed only to its civil
population and offers to allow American distributors ensure
compliance.
3. The Blacklist
Britain also extended the effective cordon by
enacting the Trading with the Enemy Act on 23 December, 1915.
This act forbade British subjects from trading with enemy
subjects living abroad, and with persons or organizations in
neutral countries engaged in lending aid to the enemy. The
published version of the act provided a helpful list of
persons or organizations which met its criteria for
suspicions of trading with the Alliance, and being included
on this list held the promise of financial ruin for an
American firm. Inclusion on the blacklist portended a
potentially omission of any firm from lucrative Entente
commerce and carried with it concomitant isolation of the
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firm from business with other American firms, lest the stigma
be transferred like a bacillus.
Although the publication of the blacklist aroused
Wilson's ire when it began including U.S. firms in July,
1916, evidence indicates that a more extensive confidential
blacklist had included American firms almost since the
beginning of the war. The sub-rosa list was not enforced by
legal penalties, but was instead enforced by the cordon--no
firm on either list was permitted to ship goods through the
blockade, and British shippers were discouraged by the
British government from shipping goods consigned by a
blacklisted firm.6
Public opposition to the blacklist policy required
action of the administration, and action was taken. In
September, 1916 Congress passed the Shipping Act and the
Revenue Act, which empowered Wilson to take measures to
severely restrict Anglo-American commerce. A study
undertaken at the time clearly indicated that such action
would be a two-edged sword, as American industry would have
been severely affected and would have invited serious
reprisals without guaranteeing British concessions. Wilson
did not use the powers at the time.
67
The intense feeling in the United States was further
assuaged through productive diplomatic channels. Legally,
6 Bailey, 1934, 15-1.9.
67 Bailey, 1934, 23-25.
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Britain had the sovereign right to forbid her own subjects to
trade with firms in America. But the need to maintain
American support led Britain to acknowledge the blunder of
the blacklist and offer considerable regret, but little real
modification, in order to reconcile the opposing
viewpoints.6
Believing the interests of the United States lay with
acquiescing to British policies affecting shipping, Wilson's
administration again allowed the neutrality agenda to be
determined by an external source whose interests were not
those of the United States. Wilson had no reason to believe
that firm action taken by his administration would be widely
supported; when the threat of applying an embargo in
retaliation for British violations of U.S. shipping rights
had the potential to be effective, popular sentiment was
predominantly supportive of the Entente for commercial and
emotional reasons. Although an important section of
political power (the Southern democrats were a significant
source of support for the Democratic incumbents) was being
hurt by British actions, there seemed to be no clear
violation which could be protested, and the economic damage
was limited in comparison to the benefits of Entente
business.
The dangers of Britain's effective cordon soon
manifested themselves. The British Admiralty made no effort
May, 329-334; Bailey, 1934, 27-34; Millis, 327-329.
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to conceal its intent to prevent any supplies from reaching
the Alliance; statements made by Churchill in February, 1915
show his confidence in the apparent success of the Entente
navies in "throttling" Germany, and the Admiralty's intent to
maintain the pressure until Germany surrendered
unconditionally.69 Allowing the British blockade of Germany
to be incrementally tightened without protest further bound
the United States to British policies. Britain extended
their cordon even further through a policy, enacted in
February, 1917, which prohibited all trade to an enemy
destination, or the transportation of enemy property, unless
licensed by, or submitting to examination by, an Entente
power. U.S. protests against this declaration were
ineffectual, and since the practical accomplishment of this
policy had already been achieved by the British minefields,
the protests were also moot. The earlier surrender of
neutrality rights in response to a policy which seemed
innocuous presaged the later ineffectiveness of protesting
what had already been accepted.
British control of the sea lanes made the cordon a
powerful weapon for degrading Germany's ability to continue
the war. Britain attempted, throughout the war, to increase
its control over all commerce between America and Europe, and
the responses to British infractions of American neutrality
ranged from non-existent to notes of protest which rarely
69 May, 218.
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contained specific terms or demands. U.S. industry's
dependence upon Entente trade made it nearly impossible for
the president to enact the embargoes which had the
ramifications necessary to compel the British to accede to
American desires.
4. The Submarine
The issues of the cordon and the blacklist further
illustrate the creeping erosion which undermined America's
neutrality throughout the pre-intervention period. The
belief that an accident of geography and Britain's maritime
superiority provided the moral justification for American
trade to be restricted to the Entente powers presupposed that
the Alliance powers would be unable to react effectively.
Wilson's tacit surrender of neutrality set the stage for the
German government to be forced to yield to the pressures of
military leaders and proclaim, in February, 1915, a war zone
around Britain in which unrestricted submarine warfare would
be used to impose a blockade. German recognition of the
inequality of American policy during this time is evidenced
by a remark made by German Minister of Marine Admiral Alfred
von Tirpitz to a United Press correspondent shortly before
Christmas in 1914,
America has not raised her voice in protest and has
taken little or no action against England's closing the
North Sea to neutral shipping. What will America say if
Germany declares war on all enemy merchant ships?
70 Tirpitz quote cited by Millis, 102.
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Wilson's decision to hold Germany "strictly accountable" for
any American loss of life as a result of submarine warfare
was a poor attempt to achieve what would have been better
achieved by prohibiting American citizens from taking passage
on Entente ships--the presence of an American on a
belligerent merchant vessel did not make the U.S. responsible
for that vessel, as Wilson's ultimatum to Germany implied.
Furthermore, the terms of the ultimatum highlight another
point concerning neutrality issues. Protests against British
transgression routinely left significant negotiating
latitude, and did not stake the honor and reputation of the
United States on the belligerents response, whereas the notes
issued to Germany clearly drew lines beyond which American
prestige would demand a response. This incongruence led
Bryan to cite the improbity of acquiescing to British efforts
to force a German surrender by inducing hardships upon
Germany's civilian population as an argument to support
71premature efforts for peace negotiations.
U.S. policies contributed to the inevitability of the
clash. Besides the policy decisions discussed above, a
decision reached by the U.S. Neutrality Board in March, 1915
legalized the entry into American ports of armed British
merchant vessels, an action which encouraged Britain's
decision to arm its merchants. Once a vessel is armed, and
issued orders to attack any submarine on sight, as was the
71 Millis, 153.
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case with the British merchantmen, the status of those
merchant vessels comes into question. Under these
circumstances an attacking submarine could provide the
warning and opportunity to abandon the vessel being attacked,
as the law of the day required, out of fear for its own
safety. The combination of conditions which precluded a
submarine from surfacing to provide the requisite warning
with the deception of flying of neutrals' flags, as British
vessels occaisionally did, virtually guaranteed American
vessels would fall prey to German submarines.
The British liner Lusitania, sunk by the German
submarine U-20 on 07 May, 1915, brought to a boil the issues
concerning American neutrality and Germany's decision to
employ the submarine to counter Britain's dominance of the
sea. The sinking of the Lusitania caused the loss of 1195
lives, of which 124 were Americans. This great loss of life
would be tragic under any circumstances, but in the spirit of
the times, the event was trumpeted by many (predominantly
Eastern-based) newspapers as confirmation of the murderous
barbarity of Wilhelmine Germany, religious figures called for
America's thunderous wrath to be loosed upon the barbarians,
and prominent Americans lent their voices to popular demands
that the President immediately demand satisfaction from the
Kaiser. 7
72 D. F. Fleming, The Origins and LeQacies of World War
I (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), 206-209;
and Millis, 172-174 both note that vehement reaction to the
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The measured response of the Wilson administration
sought to obtain that satisfaction without forcing the United
States into an untenable position. Diplomatic processes,
conducted through a series of notes, expressed the American
government's sentiment that submarines could not be employed
without compromising U.S. neutrality rights and issued stern
warnings to the Germans should American lives again be lost
in such a manner. The sinking of more British and Italian
liners, many of which incurred the loss of more Americans,
led to a hardening of American resolve against submarine
warfare which forced Germany's government to mitigate, in
May, 1916, the submarine campaign to avoid war with the
United States.
3
The German government held to its agreement to limit
the scope of its submarine warfare until January, 1917, when
German military leaders again pressured that government to
remove the fetters from its submarine commanders in an all-
out effort to secure an armistice from the Entente by August.
sinking of the Lusitania was centered in the eastern United
States, while the western part of the country reacted much
more moderately. This suggests that while the reaction
against the human tragedy of the sinking was nearly
universal, the pro-Ally/pro-intervention portions of the
populace found in the event the opportunity to further goad
public opinion towards supporting a confrontation with
Germany.
Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania,"
American Historical Review 41:1 (October 1935): 57-62,
presents a concise summation of the issues which the
submarine campaign imposed upon German-American relations
during this period.
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The likelihood of America's entry into the war due to this
action had been clearly demonstrated by the earlier
diplomatic crisis which submarine warfare had incurred, but
if the campaign was successful, the German militarists
argued, the war would be decided before the United States
could make any significant difference. This argument might
have been sound had Wilson been slower to react, but several
events combined to hasten America's entry into the war. One
was the publication of the Zimmerman note, which greatly
aided the unity of American opinion regarding war with
Germany. Another was the sinking of three American ships
returning to port in Mar, 1917. Yet another was the virtual
standstill which the renewed submarine campaign had imposed
upon American shipping. The combination of events served to
press the United States into a declaration of war upon
Germany.
E. FAILURES OF TRADITIONAL ISOLATIONISM
These issues demonstrate the most danger of attempting to
maintain a neutral position without clearly defining that
neutrality, and without taking action to defend the
principles upon which it is based. It is impossible to make
an unequivocable argument which connects alternate responses
to the issues of American neutrality during World War One
with a more fortunate outcome. It is possible, however, to
argue that gradually surrendering neutrality rights, and
shaping policies which benefitted one group of belligerents
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over another, contributed to the desperation which led
Germany to embark upon its campaign of submarine warfare
which was clearly a proximate factor in America's entry into
the war.
The United States believed, prior to the First World War,
that it was the master of its own fate and dominant within
its own hemisphere. Its relied upon isolation from the
powers of Europe as a means of ensuring it would not be
troubled by what seemed to be petty rivalries. Yet
isolationism's influence on American policy prior to
America's entry into the war clearly worked against U.S.
interests. By being unaware of the import of seemingly
unimportant factors which influenced Europe--the growing
unrest of nationalism in the Balkans, the pressure of a vital
and expanding Germany, and the decline of a moderating and
stabilizing Britain--the United States government was
completely unprepared to identify how best to exert its
influence in defense of its own interests.
Traditional isolationism supported the practice of
selling weapons to the belligerents and loaning the money
with which the weapons were to be purchased while expecting
to be happily aloof to the conflagation abroad. The ships
which plied the seas between the United States and Britain
carried with them the means for Britain to maintain its war
effort, and the sinking of those ships represented, for
Germany, the opportunity to impede the Entente's
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capabilities. Given these conditions, the United States
could not reasonably expect to be untouched by the rigors of
war.
Defending America's neutrality rights might have
prevented the United States from becoming involved in the
European war had that defense been rigorous and even-handed.
As this chapter indicates, however, those neutrality rights
were slowly eroded by Britain through its command of the sea
lanes, and by the Wilson administration, through failing to
recognize the leverage it possessed during the early part of
the war and failing to use that leverage to require the
Entente powers to recognize legitimate American interests.
As the war developed, that leverage was lost and Britain's
control of the sea became too firmly ensconced to challenge.
Another aspect which contributed to the erosion of
consideration for America's neutrality rights was the degree
to which popular American opinion supported the cause of the
Entente. Whether that opinion was founded in pro-Entente
propaganda, in cultural roots and similarities, or in
geopolitical considerations is not pertinent--as discussed
above, the U.S. population at large was sympathetic to the
cause of the Entente powers, as well as to the cause of
profit. To have issued the same ultimata to Britain as were
issued to Germany would have required the Wilson
administration to have been prepared to take either military
or trade actions against Britain, steps which would have been
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strongly resisted by the populace. When instruments to
chastise Britain for infringing upon American rights were
finally developed, Britain's foresight in developing
alternate sources of supply had already forestalled their
potential effectiveness.
Isolationism placed blinders on the development of
American foreign policy. America's preoccupation with its
own affairs and geographic self-assurance created, as Kennan
stated, a denial
of the legitimacy of the real interests and aspirations
of other peoples . . . [a] dismissal of these things as
unsubstantial and unworthy of our attention, as
"jealousies and rivalries" too silly, too "complicated,"
to deserve our respect
74
The Wilson administration, and the influence of the populace
in general, failed to recognize two ideas which spoke
strongly against isolationism--first, that the United States
could be so profoundly affected by events in Europe. Decades
of conditioning and the arrogance of nationalism effectively
argued against this idea's acceptance. Secondly, that it is
generally more efficient for a country to exert its influence
to support its interests, rather than defend them. The
distinctions are of premeditation and urgency, and the United
States, as a democracy, may be ill-prepared to support its
interests in a calculated and pragmatic fashion, instead of
defending them in a strident and self-righteous manner.
74 Kennan, 64.
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When America entered the First World War, it should have
been apparent that isolationism had failed to achieve its
goal. The war was clearly European in its origin, but
American ships were underway and American troops were
carrying arms. Once the war had ended, it is only logical
that policy-makers would seek to understand why the failure
had occured, in order that it might be avoided later. The
next chapter addresses the period between the two wars, and
how the search for an answer to the question of
isolationism's failure brought isolationist influences once
again into American foreign policy, with results which were
even more devastating for the United States, and the world,
than had already been experienced.
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III. WORLD WAR II
U.S. policy aims strove, until American involvement in
World War I, to adhere to traditional isolationism as a means
by which the United States could avoid becoming involved in
war which had developed from another country's actions or
interests. When Europe went to war in 1914, traditional
isolationism was the most fully-developed and widely
supported tenet of American foreign policy. It was therefore
espoused as the guiding principle for the Wilson
administration, and widely supported by elected
representatives and their constituents, until a culmination
of events served to align popular consensus behind American
involvement.
Arguably, traditional isolationism did not fail of its
own accord but was forsaken by a president's administration
which conspired to develop a "benevolent neutrality" which
supported the cause of the Entente at the expense of the
Alliance powers. The U.S. insistence on its right to
manufacture and export war materiel to Britain condemned an
indeterminate number of German soldiers to death just as
surely as U.S. acquiescence to British "black lists",
extended cordons, and North Sea mining programs aided
Britain's efforts to starve Germany into submission. The aim
of war is to defeat the enemy, and the United States should
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have benefitted from the lessons of its own Civil War in
realizing the import of disrupting strategic support for
one's enemy during a war. Recognition of that lesson might
have altered the U.S. approach to munitions export and
blockades, thereby averting the crucial showdown between
Germany and the United States over the submarine issue.
But the greater lesson which the United States missed lay
in the impropriety of isolationism of any form as a guide for
policy in modern international relations. Isolation impaired
America's ability to recognize the issues which drove Europe
to war. This lack contributed to two distinct failings in
American foreign policy. First, it led the U.S. government
to discount the importance of the issues, causing the Wilson
administration to attempt to develop policies which would
enable the U.S. to tread the middle path, where no path
actually existed. Secondly, it placed the American populace
at the mercy of skilled manipulators of opinion, with little
moderating influence from its own government. The "democracy
versus totalitarianism" cast given the war by British opinion
leaders was a skillful ploy which avoided the root causes of
the war in favor of an easily communicated message which was
well-received by the American public.
During the period between the end of the First World War,
in 1918, and the beginning of American involvement in the
Second World War, in 1941, historians and legislators sought
to understand why isolationism failed. From that search came
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the new form of isolationism, revisionist isolationism. This
type oi isolationism was an even more developed form of
isolationism than its predecessor, as it developed during a
period in the United States which was marked by an inward
turning of American attention. One popular view held that
America had been forced to militarily intervene in a European
war to defend its neutral rights and protect democracy in the
world, and two principal matters shaped American attitudes
towards Europe: war debts and reparations. Craig and
Gilbert state,
In the wave of postwar nationalism most Americans saw
only that they had come to the rescue of the Western
democracies in a great war, that they had played a
decisive part in the winning of that war, and that the
United States had little to show, in the way of material
gain, for the immense sums of money that had been
expended and for the loss of American lives.T
A. INTERNATIONALIST EFFORTS
1. The League of Nations
The twenty-three year inter-war period which
separated American involvement in World War I and World War
II witnessed numerous unproductive attempts by American
internationalists to use U.S. influence to achieve
cooperative measures for peace. The U.S. Senate refused to
ratify the Treaty of Versailles largely out of opposition to
the entangling alliance which the League of Nations, as part
of the treaty, represented. Article X of the League covenant
5 Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats:
1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 301.
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was the crux of the strongest objections to American
membership; the article provided mutually guaranteed
territorial integrity and political independence for League
members, supported by a pledge of economic and military
sanctions against violators contained in Article XVI. These
articles led opponents of collective security, such as a
leading isolationist Senator W. E. Borah, to claim that
membership in the League would sacrifice U. S. political
freedom of action and would involve the United States in
constant war in attempts to maintain the status quo.
President W. Wilson was committed to collective security, and
his refusal to accept Congress-supported reservations on
Article X to allow the United States to remain neutral if
U.S. and League Council opinions adjudicating responsibility
for hostilities differed virtually guaranteed the Treaty's
defeat.76
Internationalists forwarded arguments to make League
membership palatable to proponents of American neutrality.
These arguments centered on the League's dependence upon
moral suasion and its lack of any means by which a member
could be forced to support League tenets with military force.
League supporters suggested the resolution of boundary
disputes between Yugoslavia and Albania in 1922 and Italy's
retreat from Corfu in 1923 as examples of the League's
76 Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), 1-5.
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contribution to world peace through applying the moral
judgement of mankind to international relations.77 These
arguments were insufficient to bridge isolationist sentiment;
membership in the League was firmly opposed by the Senate,
and President W. G. Harding pronounced the League dead to
American foreign policy shortly after his election and
refused to answer League communications thereafter.h
2. The World Court
Another effort by internationalists to bring American
moral, if not military, influence into international
relations centered upon the World Court. American membership
in the Court received widespread support from both
internationalists and non-interventionists through its
espousal of the primacy of law over force, and its lack of
obligations; membership would entail, for the United States,
only administrative obligations--participation in the
selection of judges, and providing a share of the court's
expenses, estimated at $40 thousand per year. Although
U.S. membership in the World Court gained substantial Senate
approval, isolationist legislators ultimately forestalled
Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A
Realist Appraisal from Wilson to ReaQan (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1984), 5-7.
78 William E. Borah, cited by Karl Schriftgiesser, This
Was Normalcy (Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1948) 132.
9 Congressional Digest, May, 1923, p. 239; and
Congressional Record, 69th Cong., Ist sess., 18 December
1925, p. 1085. Cited by Graebner, 9-11.
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actual participation by insisting that a series of
reservations be attached to American membership. These
reservations included the right for the United States to
exercise all powers of a full member without being committed
to Court decisions, and a prohibition against the Court's
rendering an opinion on any issue which touched upon an
interest of the United States. The Court countered by
insisting upon the right to impose its own reservations, and
the resulting impasse ended the question of U.S. membership
in late 1926.0
3. The Kellogg-Briand Pact
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 presented the
accomplishment on paper of peaceful law. Signed by nearly
every government, it renounced war as an instrument of
national policy and advocated peaceful means to resolve all
disputes. The Senate ratified the pact in January, 1929,
Secretary of State F. B. Kellogg offered assurances to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty did not
bind the United States to take any action--the treaty
contained no provisions for sanctions or commitments for
enforcement, only a moral obligation not to aid an aggressor
country.81 The main value of the Pact was that it provided a
means by which American opinion could be shaped, in the event
Donna F. Fleming, The United States and the World
Court (Garden City: 1945), 40-43, 56.
81 Divine, 5-8.
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of a future conflict, to curtail trade with an aggressor and
thereby tacitly cooperate with League actions against
violators. Although not an actual alliance, the treaty was,
at least, a constructive departure from strict
interpretations of isolationism and neutrality.
4. The Fallacy of Internationalist Arguments
The vehicles of international involvement--the
League, the World Court, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact--
supported the international status quo by recognizing the
primacy of law over force. They supported settling of
disputes through negotiation instead of force, and in doing
so, ignored the dynamics of international relations and the
fervor of nationalism, and attempted to subordinate political
disputes to jurisprudence, with no clear means by which to
enforce decisions. Clausewitz's On War illustrates the
point. If the Clausewitz statement, "The decision by arms
is, for all operations in War, great and small, what cash
payment is in bill transactions . . .. it can never entirely
fail to occur.",8 2 is combined with, ". . . War is not merely
a political act, but also a real political instrument, a
continuation of political commerce,"'  the resulting
syllogism is simple--at some point, the ability to conduct
war becomes essential to conducting politics. Any




which to impose decisions upon dissatisfied petitioners has
made hollow promises. Examples can be found of this is in
the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931-1932, and in the
invasion of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936. In both instances,
the League's inability to develop a consensus for action
against the aggressors allowed the invasion to continue
unopposed by serious, internationally supported force.
This shortcoming was especially critical in the world
system which evolved out of the First World War.
International relations were riddled with instabilities--
reparations were forced upon Germany which were unjust and
impossible to collect, Bolshevism was creeping beyond the
borders of the Soviet Union, and the division of Europe by
the war's victors was, in some cases, arbitrary and
insensitive to nationality issues. These inherent tensions
would soon join with the ineffectiveness of the international
organizations at enforcing decisions to bring about the
collapse of the world system.
Most isolationists (and their internationalist
counterparts, the non-interventionists) recognized, in
arguments against American participation in collective
security arrangements, the requirement to support law with
force, and the danger which that requirement would pose for
the United States. N. A. Graebner credits realists of the
1920's as having recognized the vacuity of claims made by
League and Court proponents regarding the future
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effectiveness of adjudications made by international
organizations without recourse to enforcement. A Utopian
view of international politics assumes every nation which has
agreed to submit to arbitration will abide by the resulting
decisions, a perception which has been repeatedly belied by
reality. A more current example of the fallacy of this is
presented by an editorial opinion by leading conservative
columnist G. F. Will, who observed,
Recently the United States has used force to punish
Libya for sponsoring terrorism, has hijacked a plane to
capture hijackers, has supported insurgency to change the
government of Nicaragua and has changed the governments
of Grenada and Panama . . . . each was at best of
uncertain "legality." . . . "international law" is often
. . . defined in ways that serve the ruthless by
inhibiting only the scrupulous.
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During the 1920's, support for U.S. membership in the
League or the World Court gained strength from its moral
correctness, and the potential for extending American ideals
to the relations between countries by asserting the primacy
of law over force. Such support failed to account for
nations which were willing to support their claims by
resorting to force of arms in conflict with world opinion.
Nazi Germany's position viz the status quo was elucidated by
Hitler to Britain's Lord Halifax in late 1937 when he said,
The League system means the perpetuation of the
status quo. It is useless to evade the issue by saying
that Article 19 of the covenant provides for peaceful
84 Graebner, 10-12.
85 George F. Will, "The Perils of 'Legality'," Newsweek
10 September 1990, 66.
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revision. . . . It is impossible to imagine peaceful
revision with the consent of all. . . . It is a fact,
perhaps an inconvenient fact, that Germany is now a great
and powerful nation, pulsating with energy and determined
to realize what she believes to be her legitimate
aspirations.8
Hitler's statement illustrates that his understanding
of the impact of realpolitik and force on international
relations far outstripped the understanding held by League
members seeking to regulate political relations by the
influence of law. No organization could have dealt
effectively with the ruthlessness of fascist leaders of the
1930's without having clear recourse to force.
Had the simple policy of avoiding membership in
international organizations been sufficient to guarantee
neutrality, the United States would not have become involved
in the First World War. Forced to recognize that traditional
isolationism was an ineffectual foreign policy during the
twentieth century, American legislators sought to understand
isolationism's failure, and prevent its recurrence through
legislation based upon what they came to understand.
Revisionist isolation as a foreign policy principle evolved
from perceptions which were forwarded by historians and
legislators, and influenced American foreign policy from the
mid-1930's until President F. D. Roosevelt began succeeding
in his efforts to easing the restrictions which neutrality
Hitler quo+ed by the Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax
(London, 1965), 371; cited by Graebner, 32.
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legislation during the pre-World War II period placed upon
his administration.
B. THE ARMS TRADE
1. The Arms Embargo Issue of the 1930's
The issue of the American arms trade was the crucible
in which principles of American neutrality were tested by
fire during the 1930's. The U.S. Congress, moved by
revisionist arguments that the arms trade had been the
proximate cause of American involvement in World War I,
sought to find the means by which to prevent arms merchants
and financiers from creating conditions wherein the United
States found its future tied to the cause of one set of
belligerents in a war. The years following the Kellogg-
Briand Pact witnessed a number of Congressional resolutions
to impose arms embargoes during conflicts to achieve the goal
of true disassociation from a war which did not directly
affect the United States. One such resolution was introduced
by Representative T. E. Burton, another by Senator A. Capper,
and yet a third by Representative S. Porter. All were aimed
at different aspects of the arms embargo question, and varied
primarily in the scope of an embargo, and the assignment of
authority for its enactment. Burton's resolution favored a
blanket embargo, with exceptions determined by Congress.
Capper's empowered the President with the authority to
determine which country had violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
and to embargo arms exports to that country. Porter's simply
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empowered the President to embargo arms exports to countries
where conditions of domestic violence or international
conflict existed or were threatened.87 Each of these
resolutions failed, for similar reasons.
Arguments against arms embargoes repeated nearly
verbatim positions elucidated by neutralists in the Wilson
administration during the first pre-intervention period. The
main opposition to selective arms embargoes was the concern
that enacting an embargo against a single country carried the
taint of an "un-neutral" act; imposing an embargo could have
been argued to be a punitive sanction for violating pre-
determined codes of behavior. Isolationists feared that
selective embargoes would therefore invite reprisals from the
countries against which they had been used.
Additionally, entanglement continued to be the
ineluctable opposition to any form of arms embargo forwarded-
-just as Wilson's administration had formed the opinion that
an arms embargo against one belligerent country was ipso
facto support for its rival, opponents to arms embargoes in
the 1930's presented the same argument. Later efforts to
impose arms embargoes against Japan for its invasion of
Manchuria in 1931, and against Bolivia and Paraguay,
participants in the undeclared Chaco War of 1932 to 1935,
came to naught as principal factions which opposed embargoes-
-munitions manufacturers and traditional isolationists--
87 Divine, 7-17.
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united against pro-embargo factions, which were politically
divided between supporters of discriminatory embargo
measures, and advocates of impartial measures.
2. The Senate Munitions Investigating Committee
The efforts of arms manufacturers in opposing arms
embargoes backfired, however. Two books publisned in 1934
forwarded the argument that arms-makers conspired to foment
war and disrupt world peace for the purpose of profit.8 Due
largely to publicity from these publications Senator G. P.
Nye's proposal for an investigation into the munitions
industry, initially destined for a lingering demise in the
Senate Military Affairs Committee, gained widespread popular
support and quick acceptance. Nye was chosen to chair the
committee, and of seven members, four (including the chair)
were isolationists, two were moderates, and only one
advocated collective security--the committee's purpose could
be easily argued to be more concerned with finding proof that
the arms industry was responsible for U.S. involvement in
foreign wars, than with objectively investigating any
connection between the two. The strong popular support for
the committee's investigation precluded the administration
8 Divine cites the books, H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C.
Hanighen, Merchants of Death, (Boston, 1934); and George
Sides, Iron. Blood and Profits, (New York, 1934), as being
similar in premise while attributing the responsibility for
war to different sources. According to Divine, Sides views
arms merchants as having primary responsibility, while
Engelbrecht and Hanighen place responsibility on an
international order which allows arms-makers to thrive on
conflict.
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from opposing it in favor of using international cooperation
to deal with the arms problem.
89
3. The Arms Embargo and the Roosevelt Administration
President Roosevelt and his administration opened a
new era in American foreign policy. Cautiously, the new
president and his administration began looking beyond
American shores, even as they attended the economic crisis
which had developed in 1929. The issue of an arms embargo
against Japan again came to the fore in 1932, and after
initial vacillation on the administration's part, was pressed
to a vote in the face of strong Republican opposition. The
new resolution carried with it powerful undercurrents of
internationalism; the President was empowered to enact an
arms embargo, and efforts to calm fears that a war with Japan
would be the outcome should such an embargo be enacted
included assurances that it would only be imposed in
cooperation with other nations. This international flavor
was not lost on Senate minority leader H. Fish, who claimed,
• . there is just one reason, and that is to go in with
the League of Nations, to declare an embargo against
Japan, as the aggressor nation in the Far East, and have
the United States declare that embargo, with those
European nations, against Japan.9
89 Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941 American




Fish sought to amend the resolution to make it apply
impartially, but his effort was defeated on the House floor
before the resolution was put to a vote.
Roosevelt undercut the resolution, however, when it
entered the Senate. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
headed by Senator K. Pittman, communicated to the president
its refusal to accept the resolution unless it contained the
impartiality clause. Roosevelt acquiesced to these terms.
This transformed the renascent arms embargo resolution from a
vehicle through which the United States could cooperate in
collective security measures to an isolationist effort to
avoid involvement in foreign wars.
Divine suggests Roosevelt's preoccupation with
domestic economic reconstruction, and his desire to maintain
solid support in Congress for the Glass-Steagall banking
reform and the National Recovery Act, which were still under
consideration, as possible reasons for the President's
reversal of position on the arms embargo resolution. The
early New Deal deliberately excluded international economic
cooperation, and in doing so was distinctly isolationist.
Divine argues one point clearly--by early 1935, arguments
concerning American foreign policy were not concerned with
whether that policy would have an isolationist or an
internationalist cast--that argument had by then been settled
in favor of isolationists.91 The debate focused instead upon
91 Divine, 72-85.
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the question of what the nature of the isolationist cast was
to be. Traditional isolationism would have allowed arms
exports to all belligerents92 while revisionist isolationism
supported a rigid defensive perimeter behind which America
would retreat from the evil aggressor who abroad.
C. THE NEUTRALITY ACTS, 1935-1937
Spurred by the impending release of a preliminary report
to the Senate from the Nye committee, Roosevelt transformed a
meeting with that committee into an opportunity to urge the
Senate to study the whole issue of neutrality and prepare
legislation supporting it. Although surprised by the
President's move, the committee felt it held a mandate from
the President to act, and began aggressively working on the
subject. Divine suggests two possible reasons for the
President's unprecedented suggestion. First, the issue
provided a "red herring" by which somewhat embarrassing
disclosures by the committee's chairman might be allayed, and
secondly, Roosevelt may have used the committee's action on
neutrality as a goad to overcome the State Department's
procrastination on the same issue.93
92 Traditional isolationism rigidly applied would have
permitted munitions exports to all belligerents. It must be
remembered that the pre-World War I foreign policy was
theoretically based upon traditional isolationism, but the
benevolent neutrality practiced by the Wilson administration
in meeting the challenges of their time was traditional
isolationism only by declaration -- the actual practice was
closer to tacit alignment with the Entente powers.
93 Divine, 85-90.
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The move served the President well. Senator Nye stated,
while revealing the committee's new responsibilities to a
Lexington, Kentucky audience, that the President was
determined to keep America out of the war at all costs.
94
Dissension within the Senate regarding the appropriate
cognizance for neutrality legislation diluted the Nye
Committee's efforts until April, when Senators Nye and B. C.
Clark individually introduced resolutions in Congress to
restrict U.S. citizens from traveling in war zones and to
limit credit for the purchase of contraband goods by a
belligerent government.
Secretary Hull and other presidential advisers in the
State Department were wrestling unsuccessfully with
developing a common statement regarding neutrality
legislation. Hull opposed isolationist neutrality, and the
department's constant delay in any cohesive stand regarding
this issue is likely to be an indication of his efforts to
dilute or destroy the neutrality proposals, without publicly
opposing the President or the strong neutrality movement in
Congress.
1. The Neutrality Act of 1935
Hitler's announcement of his intent to build a
550,000 man army in March, 1935 led Roosevelt to hope for an
opportunity to cooperate with European democracies and press
94 "President to Avoid Any War, Says Nye," New York
Times, 31 March 1935, 26.
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for disarmament. A meeting in Stresa between Britain,
France, Italy, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia
seemed to provide the occasion the President sought, but the
inaction of the Stresa powers, and domestic American
neutrality sentiment heightened by fears of a world war
growing out of the worsening Italo-Ethiopian relations,
effectively dashed the President's hopes and helped propel
America towards the framing of the first Neutrality Law.
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Roosevelt's efforts to mitigate the restrictiveness of
legislated neutrality by pressing for a more flexible policy
were lost when war erupted between Italy and Ethiopia in the
fall.
The first Neutrality Law, signed in August, 1935,
required an impartial embargo on arms to all belligerents,
and prohibited American vessels from carrying any implements
of war. It empowered the President to warn American citizens
that travel on belligerent ships could be undertaken only at
their own risk, and established federal control over import
and export of armaments. The law drew heavily upon the
findings of the Nye Committee, and addressed most of the
issues which had seemed to draw the United States into the
Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American
Foreign Policy. 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979), 104; and Adler, 170-171, both point to the
deterioration of Italo-Ethiopian relations as the immediate
cause of popular American pressures for neutrality policies,
with subsequent German actions adding to the momentum of
isolatioxist and neutralist movements later.
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1917-1918 war.9 The law aided Italy immensely more than it
did Ethiopia, since Ethiopia had no power to affect shipping
to Italy. American trade with Italy mounted to the point
that Roosevelt and Hull asked American businesses to observe
a "moral embargo" to cut back on Italy's access to oil and
other commodities which, although not specifically
restricted, were necessary for modern war.
2. The Neutrality Act of 1936
The first neutrality law was self-limited to six
months, and its mandated demise brought abovt the second
neutrality law in February, 1936. The administration's
efforts to redefine its position on flexibility in a manner
amenable to Congress died in committee, and in its place,
Congress built the walls of isolationism even higher by
extending the basic provisions of the first law, and adding
two significant amendments to them. The first drew even more
heavily on the Nye Committee's work and forbade the extension
of loans to belligerent powers. The second amendment
modified a clause in the 1935 act which allowed a degree of
presidential discretion in extending an existing arms embargo
to new belligerents if hostilities spread beyond their
initial boundaries. The altered clause required the
President to extend embargoes to all countries involved in a




European tensions were expanding to include more counitries,
Congress clearly sought to prevent the President from
circumventing its stance on neutrality by providing support
to France or Britain indirectly, through using a later entry
into the fray as an intermediary.
3. The Neutrality Act of 1937
Isolationist sentiment in Congress did not weaken
during the period in which the Neutrality Act of 1936 was in
effect. Its successor, the permanent Neutrality Act of 1937,
maintained the high walls of isolation already built, and
added a parapet at the top. All principles of the previous
laws were retained, plus the new law forbade the arming of
American merchant ships, and empowered the President to place
trade with belligerents in goods other than arms and
implements of war on a cash-and-carry basis. Although the
"cash-and-carry" principle held seeds which would be used
later to make inroads into neutrality legislation, Congress
had so obviously attempted to attend every factor which might
have drawn the United States into World War I that the New
York Herald-Tribune suggested as a title "Act to Preserve the
United States From Intervention in the War of 1914-18.' 98
The newly legislated neutrality of the United States
underscored America's determination not to become involved in
any international dispute. The automaticity of its tenets
98 New York Herald-Tribune, cited by Gloria J. Barron,
Leadership in Crisis: FDR and the Path to Intervention (Port
Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1973), 19.
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guaranteed that, should Italy or Germany declare war against
the League powers, the United States would accord the League
exactly the same consideration it gave Hitler or Mussolini,
and refuse assistance to international efforts to contain
aggression, just as it refused assistance to the aggressors.
Although an impartial arms embargo favored the fascist
powers, whose military production outstripped that of the
democracies, the "cash-and-carry" provisions of the act did
tacitly assist the democratic powers. Since the Royal Navy
largely controlled the sea lanes, Britain could intervene in
Axis efforts to purchase important supplies from American
businesses.
4. Asia and the Neutrality Act of 1937
The effects of the 1937 neutrality act in Eastern
Asia were not as supportive of U.S. interests. When Sino-
Japanese hostilities erupted in July, 1937, it became
apparent that China, which was heavily dependent upon
imported munitions, would be hindered by the American
neutrality act, whereas Japan, which was largely self-
sufficient in weapons but depended on unrestricted
commodities, would benefit. The Roosevelt administration
solved the quandary by temporizing. Despite heavy pressure
from isolationists to effect the embargo, Roosevelt used the
limited discretionary power the neutrality act had granted
him--no declaration of war had been made by either of the
belligerents, therefore it was left to the President to
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decide when a condition of war existed which warranted
invoking the tenets of the act. Roosevelt and Hull resisted
isolationist insistence that they were nullifying the law,
and placed the invocation of an embargo "on a 24-hour basis".
Later the administration did partially succumb to
isolationist pressures by prohibiting government-owned ships
from transporting arms to either China or Japan, and declared
that any merchant vessels flying the American flag would
transport arms to the belligerents at their own risk.
American munitions trade with China continued apace, albeit
by a more circuitous route; American ships carried munitions
bound for China to England, where the munitions were trans-
shipped to British bottoms bound for Hong Kong.9
Another area in which the administration demonstrated
partiality towards China lay in the export of aircraft to
Japan. Japanese air attacks on Chinese cities afforded Hull
the opportunity to denounce the bombing of civilians, and to
publicly express deep regret over issuing licenses for the
exportation of airplanes to countries guilty of such
atrocities. J. C. Green, who was in charge of issuing such
licenses, conveyed the government position directly to
aircraft manufacturers, who were dependent upon government
contracts and complied with the new policy.
00
Divine, 207-210.
100 "Third Annual Report of the National Munitions
Control Board," House Document no. 92, 76th Congress, 1st
sess. (Washington, 1939), 80; cited by Divine, 217.
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The same tactic which enabled Roosevelt to avoid
restrictions of the neutrality laws, however, worked against
U.S. efforts regarding raw materials. Raw materials
continued to be exported to Japan, largely as a consequence
of the support given by the United States to international
agreements. The Treaty of Commerce, signed and ratified in
1911, precluded enacting an embargo against a foreign power
when no actual condition of war was recognized, unless six
months notice was provided. Not until July, 1939 did Japan
receive the requisite notice, which allowed it to continue
importing American scrap iron and petroleum products until
January, 1940.101
Circumventing the provisions of the neutrality laws
enabled the Roosevelt administration to continue American
support of China, mollify isolationists, and demonstrated the
vacuity of laws which attempted to predetermine American
policies in international relations. U.S. interests were
more closely aligned with the Chinese, and the Japanese were
most obviously the aggressors, but neutrality legislation
took no account of these unforeseen factors. Instead,
Congressional determination not to become involved in another
war which did not directly and obviously affect American
freedom, guided by lessons which were drawn from the previous
world war and widely publicized by the Nye Committee, shaped
101 Bemis, 354-358.
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neutrality legislation which was shortsighted, arbitrary, and
failed to properly support American interests.
Shortly after he had successfully skirted the 1937
neutrality legislation, Roosevelt delivered the "quarantine
speech," which suggested the United States adopt a more
internationalist policy without specifically stating the
means by which that policy would be implemented. Several
writers, including Divine, Dalleck and Graebner suggest the
President made the speech largely to test the national
sentiment regarding isolationism, and that he found it
vehemently so, compelling him to retreat from further
internationalist endeavors. It might be argued instead that
Roosevelt, encouraged by national acquiescence to his scheme
for tacitly aligning American policy in the Far East with
that of the League, sought to maintain cautious pressure
against isolationists while his administration developed
policies for making greater inroads into the isolationist
camp. Whichever is the case, angry isolationist reaction
drove him away from his efforts to increase American
influence in world affairs.
D. MUNICH: WATERSHED OF ISOLATIONISM
The Czechoslovakia crisis of 1938 did little to convince
Americans they should support Britain and France in any
attempt to contain an expansionist German government.
Americans generally believed Roosevelt had contributed to
solving the crisis by pressing both Hitler and Italian leader
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B. Mussolini to negotiate a peaceful settlement; Dalleck
argues that the two fascist dictators viewed Roosevelt's
efforts as gestures made by a powerless man, and that Hitler
was encouraged to negotiate more by the belief that employing
military force was unnecessary to gain the capitulation of
France and Britain.102 Chamberlain's optimism that the Munich
agreement and the subsequent declaration of friendship signed
between Britain and Germany heralded a new era of peace did
not take into account the appetites of Mussolini and Hitler,
nor their willingness to suffer the indignant outcries of
western democracies as German and Italian troops boundary
stakes into previously sovereign territory.
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1. Breaking the Grip of Isolationism
Following Munich, Roosevelt's administration
increasingly focused on breaking the isolationist grip on
foreign policy, and developing the military muscle which
would give weight to an American role in international
politics. In November, the President remarked,
When I write to foreign countries I must have
something to back up my words. Had we this summer five
thousand planes and the capacity immediately to produce
ten thousand per year, even though I might have to ask
Congress for authority to sell or lend them to the
102 Dallek, 166.
103 Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1914, 3d ed. (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972), 649-651.
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countries in Europe Hitler would not have dared to take
the stand he did.0
4
,
This remark illustrates three main themes which influence the
Administration's policies following the Munich agreement.
The first, and most evident, was the need for military power.
The absence of such power relegated the U.S. position to
advocacy of moral suasion to accomplish foreign policy
objectives. Hitler and Mussolini had by this time proven the
fallacy of such a position. Table 1 presents the
expenditures of the United States, Britain, France, Germany
and Italy during the period 1933-1938, expressed as
percentage of each country's gross national product (GNP).
The anemic level of American military expenditures during
this period is clearly indicated, especially during the
latter part of the period when the other countries have
clearly begun preparations for war.
The second theme the comment illustrates is
recognition that the U.S. might be required to support its
own security by providing armaments to belligerents
selectively, rather than impartially restricting, (or
conversely, impartially providing) weapons to foreign powers.
The magnitude of U.S. armaments provided to Britain and
France during the first world war clearly held a precedent
104 Quotation from Herman Oliphant, memo of White House
meeting, 14 November 1938, cited in David Reynolds, The
Creation of the AnQlo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in
Competitive Co-operation (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1982), 42.
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for an impending second war, and Germany's newly won access
to Austrian and Czechoslovakian manufacturing resources, with
which it could further support its rearmament program,
clearly exacerbated the imbalance. The level of support
Germany and Italy were committing to military development was
readily evident in publicly available sources at the time;
Paul Studenski cites League of Nations Armaments Yearbook,
and other open sources, in developing the statistics which
are depicted in Table 1, below. Germany's accelerated
rearmament in the latter part of the decade, feebly shadowed
by that of Great Britain and France, stands in sharp contrast
against the steadfastly minimal expenditures of the United
States.
Rearmament efforts gained urgency from two
considerations. The first, obviously, was the need to create
a deterrent effect which Hitler would be required to take
account, both for American security and for that of European
countries threatened by Hitler's aggression. The second was
to support, in a convoluted fashion, American neutrality.
Changing the neutrality laws to favor one belligerent or the
other, after the outbreak of war, would have been an
decidedly unneutral act, a fact noted by W. J. Bryan during
the pre-intervention period of the first war. Altering the
law before hostilities, however, might still have maintained
America's neutral posture, if the changes were made in the
absence of specific circumstances which might cause such
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changes to favor one belligerent over the other. 1 5 In
retrospect, the argument could be made that it really was
immaterial whether U.S. neutrality laws favored Britain and
France over Germany before, or after, September, 1939. At
the time, however, neutrality was still a major issue with
which lawmakers had to contend.
A third theme which Roosevelt's remark illustrates is
the President's frustration with, and desire to increase, the
level of American influence in international affairs. Any
argument that U.S. influence aided in averting war by
persuading Hitler to enter into international negotiations
regarding his demands on the ill-fated Czech state is
specious--Hitler had no reason to be concerned about the
desires of an America whose most consistent foreign policy
theme was non-involvement. The German chancellor gained
time in which to foment the fracturing of the Czechoslovakian
105 Bemis, 364-366, argues that popular opinion was
overwhelmingly sympathetic to the British and French cause,
but equally as overwhelmingly in favor of neutrality during
the period of 1938-1939.
106 T. R. Fehrenbach, in FDR's Undeclared War, 1939 to
1941 (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967), 23-24,
states the broad outlines of American foreign policy in the
1930's were, "1. in the Orient, an undefinable generalization
called the Open Door, which really meant the United States
wanted no one power to dominate there and freeze the others
out; 2. in the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the
Caribbean, predominance, which F.D.R. continued but
ameliorated by changing the Large Policy with its incessant
Marine interventions into the Good Neighbor Policy which
spawned a rash of dictators; 3. In Europe, nonintervention
and neutrality, which, however, as all European chancellories
were aware, did not exclude the continual giving of advice."
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state, and to further consolidate his gains in central
Europe. Additionally, he gained the support of much of the
German army leadership which, if on the verge of a coup
d'etat prior to the occupation of Prague, certainly had no
intention of doing so afterwards. The Munich capitulation
did not avert war, it simply delayed it and made it even more
unavoidable.
2. The Renewal of the Neutrality Debate
During the months which followed the Munich
capitulation, Roosevelt's administration moved to introduce
measures which would enable the United States to aid
countries which opposed aggression. Measures favored by the
107 Developed from statistics cited in Paul Studenski,
"Armament Expenditures in Principal Countries," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 2:14 (Mar
1941): 30-31.
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State Department incluc.ed the repeal of the arms embargo (or,
if dictated by political expediency, presidential discretion
in the invocation of an arms embargo), and the adoption of
the cash-and-carry formula for all exports, including arms,
to belligerents. Roosevelt's address to the Congress on 04
January, 1939 specifically addressed the neutrality issue,
saying,
At the very least, we can and should avoid any
action, or any lack of action, which will encourage,
assist, or build up an aggressor. We have learned that
when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our
neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly--may
actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the
victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us
that we ought not to let that happen any more.108
Ideology presented only part of the impetus which
moved Roosevelt to press for means by which to make support
available to Hitler's opponents. As he explained to a group
of senators in January, 1939, technology and economic
dependence had combined to place the Americas within Hitler's
grasp, once his domination of Europe had been established.
109
If Hitler's actions following the Munich capitulation carried
with them any clear message, it was that the German
dictator's thirst for conquest would not be quenched. A.
Frye supports Roosevelt's thesis with evidence that Hitler's
108 Samuel Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1938-50), vol. VIII, 1-
3, cited in Divine, 234.
10 Edward M. Bennett, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
Search for Security (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources
Inc., 1985), 158-159.
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government was actively engaged in efforts to introduce the
Nazi new world order into the Western Hemisphere well before
war had broken out in Europe, and further argues that once
Hitler had dominated Europe, he would have turned next to the
resource-laden lands across the Atlantic.110
Herwig also presents a strong argument that the scope
of Hitler's ambition was not bound by the European continent.
Even as isolationists in America expressed concern that a
misstep would ignite a confrontation between Nazi Germany and
the United States, German navy planners had embarked upon a
building program which called for the construction, completed
by 1948, of a balanced modern navy. The plans included ten
battleships, fifteen pocket battleships, four aircraft
carriers, five heavy cruisers, forty-four light cruisers,
sixty-eight destroyers, ninety torpedo boats, twenty-seven
ocean-going submarines, and 222 U-boats. Later, in mid-
1940, the plan was amended and expanded to more specifically
adapt it to war against the United States.111 Hitler
recognized, according to Herwig's argument, the inevitability
of war between the United States and Germany, and
specifically included consideration for such a war in his
planning. The incompatibility of Nazi Germany domination in
Europe, and eventually in South America, with U.S. interests
110 Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere
1933-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
11Herwig, 192-194.
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made such a war pre-ordained. Yet isolationists in the
United States continued to espouse the ideal of maintaining
the United States in an insular position.
Hull emphasized the administration's concern over the
potential magnitude of the coming war when he warned a group
of senators, at a private meeting, that the coming conflict
would not be "another goddam piddling dispute over a boundary
line, but an assault on the peace of the world by powerful
nations, armed to the teeth, preaching the doctrine of naked
force and practicing a philosophy of barbarism."
112
Additional motivation derived from the administration's
knowledge of a possible pact between the Nazis and the
Soviets. The Soviets had become frustrated with attempting
to secure commitments from Britain and France regarding
opposing a German adventure. Negotiations between a Stalin
and British diplomats broke down over Stalin's insistence
that occupying the Baltic states was essential for him to
strengthen Soviet defenses against Germany, and while the
Allies hesitated, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was consummated on 23
August, 1939. The pact, with its secret tenets assigning
spheres of influence, alleviated Hitler's concerns about
being countered by the Soviet divisions which faced him
across Poland.
The changes to the Neutrality Act of 1937 which were
recommended by the State Department would have conferred upon
112 Adler, 210-211.
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the President greater flexibility in imposing embargoes.
Isolationist sentiment quickly flared against the proposed
measures, and opponents to Roosevelt's efforts cited
Switzerland, and other neutral European countries, as
examples of governments who did not seek to intervene in
external disputes, and still did not feel threatened.
Senator R. A. Taft predicted that any war would be
protracted, and if it did occur, combined allied might would
"crush the Fascist upstarts." His solution was not to ease
the conditions of American neutrality, but to ensure they
were even more restrictive.113
During the six month American debate on neutrality,
Hitler's occupation of Prague repudiated his claim that he
intended only to annex those portions of Czechoslovakia which
were predominantly German, Mussolini ordered the invasion of
Albania, and Japan seized territory in the Western Pacific.
The appearance of "Danzig" and "Polish corridor" in Nazi
propaganda following the occupation of Czechoslovakia
signalled the next morsel toward which the German government
would turn its hunger. Discussion of the impending war
dropped the term "if" and substituted in its place the
definitive "when". Isolationists in Congress succeeded in
blocking changes to the 1937 act, and when Congress adjourned
on 05 August, Borah claimed he was convinced by better
sources of information than the State Department that Europe
113 Adler, 210-212.
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was in no danger of war. Roosevelt released Borah's
statement, which helped discredit the extreme isolationists
later in the year, while Hull ordered his staff to draw up
proclamations and executive orders that would be needed when
war erupted.
The difficulty in achieving domestic consensus for
U.S. foreign policy is demonstrated by a poll taken by
Fortune shortly after the war began. The Americans polled
were all generally well-educated and well-informed leaders of
business and industry. Within this group, eighty-three
percent wanted the Allies to defeat Germany, but only twenty
percent thought the United States should help by all means
short of war, while only seventeen percent believed that
America had a moral right to send become involved in the war.
Strong public sentiment against American intervention, even
as Europe entered into the convulsions of war, clearly
precluded interventionists from exercising stronger
leadership to bring American influence to bear.
3. The Neutrality Act of 1939
After he declared American neutrality, as required by
the Neutrality Act of 1937, Roosevelt moved to strengthen the
defense of the western hemisphere by creating, in concert
with Latin America, a neutral zone extending 300 miles out to
sea around the entire hemisphere, with the exception of
European possessions and Canada. This zone was to be
patrolled and enforced through mutual agreement by all the
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American states, although the preponderance of naval power
and long tradition of the Monroe Doctrine clearly established
the United States as the primary sponsor of the zone.
Roosevelt's next move was to exploit the political
ammunition Bofah's ill-advised statement had provided as he
called Congress into special session to demand repeal of the
Neutrality Acts. The move was heartily opposed by the
deeply-rooted Senate isolationists, who repeatedly cited the
lessons of 1917 in emotional appeals for American neutrality.
Fehrenbach discusses this debate and its foundation, and
proposes that Roosevelt had three choices regarding the arms
embargo repeal he sought. The first was to build a public
consensus to pressure Congress; the second was to circumvent
Congressional desires, if he could find a way; the third was
to seek a compromise.114 According to Fehrenbach, Congress
was, in 1939, a largely representative body which followed
rather than created a national consensus and was therefore
largely concerned with domestic, rather than inter-ational,
politics. As the Fortune poll cited above indicated,
Americans largely supported aid to the Allies, provided that
aid stopped short of direct involvement in a war. The
immediacy of the crisis robbed the President of the time
necessary to develop the public consensus which would have
been required, while public sentiment favoring neutrality
clearly diminished the viability of circumvention as an
114 Fehrenbach, 38-41.
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option. Roosevelt was therefore forced to accept the third
option.
Roosevelt's compromise, the Neutrality Act of 1939,
still largely aimed at repeating the lessons of World War I.
Munitions could be sold to belligerents by American
manufacturers, but only if title was transferred before the
exports left the United States, and only foreign bottoms
could carry war materiel to belligerents. Supporters of
collective security and/or aiding the beleaguered democracies
had long endorsed this clause as a means by which to oppose
Hitler while maintaining a facade of neutrality-- Britain's
command of the sea lanes made this tenet particularly
supportive of the Allies. Additionally, as a result of the
compromise, war zones were delineated around Europe, into
which American ships or citizens were not to go on private
business--there would be no recurrence of incidents like that
of the Lusitania. 115 On 04 November, 1939 the Neutrality Act
of 1939 became law.
Alleviating the strictures of the previous neutrality
act allowed a great deal of material assistance to Britain.
Military aircraft ordered by Great Britain and France
received priority over military orders from the U.S.
government. 116 Removing the encumbrances of neutrality on the
115 Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American




export of aircraft allowed them to be flown under their own
power by belligerent pilots originating in the United States,
and by American pilots over belligerents' territory. U.S.
government arsenals transferred rifles, machine guns, anti-
aircraft guns, mortars, field pieces and divers other types
of military equipment to private corporations, and thence to
Britain. These, and many other clear demonstrations of
support, aided British efforts to resist the Nazi onslaught.
As Hitler's drive into Poland spurred Congress into
action to rethink neutrality legislation, the rapidity of his
victory in western Europe similarly provided the needed
stimulus for Congress to open the coffers and fund an
aggressive rearmament program. In January, 1940 Roosevelt
asked Congress to appropriate just under $2 billion for
defense, a small increase over the 1939 appropriations.
Between January and May, Congress progressively whittled away
at the amount requested. In mid-May, after Hitler's army had
driven into Belgium, Roosevelt requested an additional $1
billion for defense and before the end of the month both the
Senate and the House had approved an amount which exceeded
the request by $500 million. Three weeks later Congress
approved another $1 billion, and by September, yet another $5
billion. The new American attitude regarding U.S.
responsibilities abroad found expression in the Committee to
Defend America by Aiding the Allies, an organization which
promoted American support to Britain and France at a grass-
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roots level. As the war in Europe progressed, American
popular opinion shifted to strongly support aid to the
European democracies, but still strongly opposed direct
involvement in the war.117
4. Defense of the Western Hemisphere
Bound by public sentiment to eschew involvement in
Europe, administration efforts focused instead on the
Americas. To counter Nazi infiltration in the Western
Hemisphere, the United States used economic concessions and
loans to offset the lures of Axis agents in Latin American
countries. Using threats of Reich retaliation against
countries which refused to do business, these agents were
already writing purchase orders. The Act of Havana, adopted
in July, 1940, provided for jcint action in the event the
"no-transfer" principle, which blocked transfer of New World
colonies from one European power to another, became
threatened as a result of Hitler's or Mussolini's conquest of
a European country with New World possessions.
Concern for the security of the hemisphere also made
the "destroyers for bases" deal concluded between the United
States and Britain palatable to the American public.
Political opposition initially precluded the Roosevelt
administration from transferring U.S. warships to Britain.
The conquest of France had given the German navy excellent
ports from which to sally into the Atlantic, and by mid-1940
117 Divine, 1965, 84-86.
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the British were in dire need of escort vessels. As
Congressional approval was not likely to be forthcoming
Roosevelt traded, in a move suggested by a group cf New York
lawyers, fifty overage destroyers to Britain in return for
rent-free, ninety-nine year leases to air and naval bases in
eight British possessions118--in return for slightly over a
quarter of a million dollars, the United States had acquired
bases from which to guard approaches to the United States and
the Caribbean.
5. Lend-Lease
The end of 1940, however, brought an even more
complete break with neutrality. Churchill conveyed to
Roosevelt, in a letter delivered by seaplane to a cruiser on
which the President was embarked, the gravity of the British
plight. Staggered by losses to U-boats in the Atlantic,
lacking the cash to pay for American orders on file, and
desperate for aircraft, ships, and countless other categories
of war materiel, the British Prime Minister petitioned
Roosevelt for "an unexampled effort [on the part of the
United States] believing that it can be made.'1 19 Three days
later Roosevelt used his famous "garden hose" analogy to





The American public provided a powerful and
overwhelmingly positive response to Roosevelt's Lend-Lease
scheme, enough so that after three months of hearings and
testimony, most efforts to amend the Lend-Lease bill were
beaten away. Britain's plight regarding financial capital
was so grievous that the British government undertook a
monumental gamble; to better enable the Roosevelt
administration to approach Congress on its behalf, the
British treasury opened its records and provided a full
disclosure of the state of Britain's finances.120 The bill,
and the $7 billion required to fund it, were approved in
March by both the House and the Senate by four-to-one and
two-to-one margins, respectively. The extension of Lend-
Lease to the Soviet Union after June enabled that country to
make use of the "arsenal of democracy" as well.
Lend-Lease contributed an important step in American
defense when it was adopted. It spurred a fledgling
rearmament drive into full bloom as production of war
material for export increased to meet Allied needs. American
preparedness for war was still a major concern in 1941, and
Overy and Wheatcroft state that it was caution born of fear
120 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The
Undeclared War 1940-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1953), 213-289, provides a very thorough study of
the Lend-Lease Bill, and the negotiations and hearings which
preceded its acceptance. Reynolds, 145-168, discusses Lend-
Lease from the British perspective, which provides an
interesting interpretation of the issues from the perspective
of the petitioner.
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of war with Japan or Germany before U.S. defenses could be
made ready which kept Roosevelt from embarking upon a more
vigorous effort to aid the victims of aggression.121 Popular
and Congressional opinion, also, had to be informed to
support a concentrated war effort. The clearly indicated
opposition, on both counts, to intervention in "another
European war" mandated an overt act be committed by a hostile
power before widespread support for U. S, entry into the war
could coalesce. Entering the war under any other
circumstances could have easily presented Roosevelt with a
politically fractured and resentful country, within which
isolationists, anti-New Dealers, and other political
opponents could have been counted on to clamor for withdrawal
from the war effort before victory had been achieved.
6. Maritime Defense
The issue of American convoys and escorts presented
yet another arena in which isolationists and non-
interventionists sought to prevent the United States from
becoming involved in war with Germany. Roosevelt was forced
to choose the more conservative of two strategic plans for
defending the western hemisphere from Axis aggression partly
due to political pressure from a joint resolution, introduced
by Senator C. W. Tobey and Representative H. Sauthoff which
would have prohibited the use of American merchant vessels to
121 Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War:
The OriQins of World War II (New York: Random House, Inc.,
1989), 288-290.
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transport cargo to belligerents, and of American naval craft
to escort them,122 and partly because, as Roosevelt himself
acknowledged, to have ordered American vessels to conduct
escort duties could have been tantamount to war.
1 3
The adopted plan, sagaciously labeled "Hemisphere
Defense Plan 2," directed American escort vessels to assume
that Axis ships in Western Hemisphere waters were motivated
by possible "unfriendly interest," but authorized U.S.
vessels only to follow Axis warships along shipping lanes,
broadcast their positions to British ships, and generally
render Axis operations hazar-:', within the boundaries of
restrictive rules of engagement to preclude American vessels
from firing the first shot. Additionally, the plan assumed
that Axis vessels approaching within twenty-five miles of any
British possession on which an American base had been
established threatened the safety that base, and authorized
the attack of such vessels if they failed to heed warnings to
stand clear.124
Another consideration which undoubtedly moved
Roosevelt to select the more conservative patrol plan was the
situation in the Pacific. The more aggressive plan would
have required significant naval assets be transferred from
122 "Congress is Urged to Forbid Convoys," New York
Times, 01 April 1941, 18.
123 Reynolds, 198-200.
124 Langer and Gleason, 440-449.
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the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic fleet. The Russo-Japanese
Non-aggression Pact, signed on 13 April, 1941, secured
Japan's northern flank and freed that country's forces to
conduct more aggressive activities southward. To have
weakened American defense in the Pacific could easily have
invited increased Japanese aggression in the western Pacific
area.
Later, in September, 1941, an exchange of fire
between a U-boat and a patrolling U.S. destroyer, the Greer,
provided the opportunity and the motive to change the rules
of engagement in the Atlantic from "trail and report" to
"attack on sight." Referring to German naval units as
"rattlesnakes of the Atlantic," Roosevelt ascribed to the
Nazis the intent to abolish the freedom of the seas, and
announced an undeclared war between the U.S. and German
navies in the Atlantic. Although subsequent Senate inquiry
revealed that the truth behind the action was less damning of
the German submarine's intent than Roosevelt's account of it
had led many to believe, popular opinion continued to support
the "attack on sight" policy.
125
Events in the North Atlantic, such as the incident
involving the Greer, or those involving the Kearney and the
Reuben James--two other American destroyers suffering torpedo
attacks by German submarines in which 11 and 115 American
sailors were lost, respectively--provided the popular support
125 Dallek, 290-294.
106
the Administration needed to push for, and receive, repeal of
provisions of the Neutrality Act. The act had become moot at
this point, and by securing the repeal of those provisions in
the act which restricted the arming of merchant vessels,
prohibited American vessels from entering belligerent ports,
and required the President to establish combat zones around
belligerent countries, the administration was freed to take
actions in "defense of American rights.,
126
This clearly marks a return to the pre-intervention
period of 1914-1917, when "defense of American rights"
demanded a declaration of war in retaliation for actions
taken by Germany to mitigate the support the United States
was providing Britain. That Roosevelt could not request an
outright declaration of war is illustrated by the closeness
of the vote regarding the repeal of the above-cited
provisions of the Neutrality Act; in the Senate the vote was
50 to 37, in the House, it edged through by eighteen votes--
212 to 191. The President could take actions, as commander-
in-chief, which could be reasonably, (or in the case of the
Gr~er, falsely) ascribed to defense of the hemisphere, but to
ask for outright war at this time might have broken his
tenuous control of the situation.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941
and Hitler's subsequent declaration of war on the United
States in the same month were the overt acts needed to unify
126 Reynolds, 214-216.
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popular and Congressional opinion, and strike isolationism's
shackles on the Roosevelt administration's actions.
"Europe's war" became, with the attack, America's war and few
in America dared raise opposition to providing whatever means
were necessary for the United States to defeat and chastise
the aggressors. The very survival of the United States had
become the stakes for which the war was being fought.
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IV. THE COLD WAR
After the Second World War ended in August, 1945 a new
world system emerged. Cooperation between the United States,
Britain, and the Soviet Union gradually eroded during the
latter part of World War II, as the allies drove the German
and Japanese armies back within the borders from where they
had originated, and the last vestiges of cooperation shredded
irretrievably over the issue of the occupation of Germany.
The ensuing political dualism in Europe centered on the two
countries which emerged from the war as pre-eminent powers.
The sponsor of the democracies, the United States had
maintained its industrial capacity intact, its productive
population relatively whole and well-mobilized, and its
economy sound through the blessing of geographic isolation,.
The leading power among the communist governments, the Soviet
Union, had seen significant portions of its industry
destroyed, and had suffered starvation, catastrophic
casualties, and near-defeat, but through coercive
mobilization emerged from the war with the most powerful
military force in Europe.
The conflict between the interests of the Western powers
and those of the Soviet Union is the subject of extensive
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historical analysis and theorizing. 127 A broad generalization
points to the distrust with which each viewed the other as
the taproot of the Cold War--Soviet leader J. Stalin
repeatedly sought security cooperation with France and
Britain before the war, and the lesson of the Munich
appeasement helped convince him to direct his diplomatic
efforts toward a pact with Nazi Germany. Similarly, Stalin
chafed under the apparent reluctance of the Western powers to
open the "second front" in France to draw off some of the
Wehrmacht's power, which was inflicting massive casualties
upon the Red Army. After the war, Stalin also expressed his
view regarding the restoration of territory to governments of
popular representation, saying,
This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a
territory also imposes on it his own social system.
Everyone irposes his own system as far as his army can
reach. It cannot be otherwise.
128
The urge to impress communist ideology and Soviet control
upon occupied territories can be largely attributed to a
combination of communist expansionism and Stalin's desire to
127 Some sources which present good overviews of the
origins of the Cold War are Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H.
Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 3d ed.
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1988); Craig, Europe Since 1914,
and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Specific historic
details regarding dates, locations, and historic figures are
also derived from William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of
World History, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1980).
128 Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1962), 114.
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maintain geographical buffers against the future invasion
which Stalin expected to come from the West.
Aligned against the "communist bloc", as the group of
Soviet-aligned governments came to be called, were the
democracies of the West. The leading power among these
democracies, the United States, had taken steps toward an
isolationism-influenced foreign policy prior to the war's
end. President F. D. Roosevelt stated at Yalta in February,
1945 that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe by
two years after the war's end, and the rapid demobilization
of the American armed forces following the war clearly
supported that statement. Army manpower decreased from 8.02
million to 1.89 million within a year, the Navy's strength
fell from 3.4 million to 1.6 million in six months, and the
Army Air Force declined from 218 combat groups to only 109 in
even less time. 129 As with a collapsing balloon, the rapidly
deflating military structure did not assume any planned form-
-a report submitted during October, 1946 by the Joint
Strategic Survey Committee stated that more than a year would
be required to reconstitute a fraction of the U.S. military
position which had been lost in the first month following the
war. Estimates submitted during the following month by the
European and Pacific theater commanders contained indications
129 Figures cited by Samuel P. Huntington in The Common
Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), 34-35.
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that their troops were capable of achieving no more than
fifty percent of their wartime combat efficiency.
130
This rapid demobilization clearly indicates an intent
among American policy makers to return to America's
traditional self-preoccupation. Popular sentiment and
legislative pressure to "bring the boys home" after having
won the war was an early manifestation of renascent
isolationism which could easily have continued to develop to
proportions similar to the inter-war period of 1919 to 1939.
Even at this early and limited beginning, isolationist
sentiment forced a divergence between U.S. foreign policy and
the military policy which supported it. The Soviet Union
exploited this divergence, and supported its own statecraft
with the intimidation of military occupation of Europe. The
Soviets backed their trheats by massing forces in central
Europe which outnumbered, by 1947, American forces twenty-
fold. As one American military observer stated at the time,
"All the Russians need to get to the Channel is shoes.,
131
The military demobilization of the United States seemed to
indicate its own intent of returning to its own hemisphere
once again, even at the risk of inviting an aggressively
expansionist power to thrust into the vacuum left behind.
130 Huntington, 33-36.
131 Theodore White, Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-
Century (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1953), 32.
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A. THE POST-WAR DEMISE OF ISOLATIONISM
The importance of American involvement in Europe,
especially as a counter to the post-war expansionism of the
Soviet Union, was clear to numerous figures in the
administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and H. S. Truman.
Even as the democracies of the West undertook the challenge
of rebuilding the devastation wrought in Europe by nearly six
years of war, the Soviet Union sought to exploit the misery
and suffering of war-ravaged peoples as fertile ground in
which to sow the seeds of communist expansion. Estimates of
Soviet intentions warned of a political power seeking to
extend its influence over weakened neighbors through local
communist parties. Secretary of State J. F. Byrnes and
American Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. A. Harriman
endorsed a firm approach against Soviet efforts to create an
"establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty
and democracy" in the European countries which Soviet forces
had "liberated" from the Germans.132 G. F. Kennan sought to
warn policy-makers of possible consequences which a power
vacuum in Europe would invite in relations with the Soviet
Union. In a lengthy telegram sent from Moscow in 1946,
Kennan said of the Soviet Union, and of the threat presented
by them,
We have here a political force committed fanatically to
the belief that with the United States there can be no
permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary
132 Huntington, 33-34.
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that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our
traditional way of life destroyed, the international
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be
secure. This political force has complete power of
disposition over the energies of one of the world's
greatest peoples and the resources of the world's richest
national territory . . . . The problem of how to cope with
this force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy
has ever faced and probably the greatest it will ever have
to face.
133
Roosevelt and Truman both expressed willingness to follow
the suggested policy of resolution and strength. Early
demonstrations of American resolve in the face of the Soviet
political threat were made to indicate the U.S. intended to
remain actively engaged in European security--the USS
Missouri went to Turkey in 1946, and in 1947 the Truman
Doctrine hurled a direct challen-: Lo Communist opportunism,
while the Marshall Plan proffered economic support with which
European governments might develop zsfficient political
stability and economic recovery to frustrate communist
efforts.
1. The Vandenberg Resolution
Events in Czechoslovakia during early 1948 further
indicated that American involvement was essential for Europe
to resist Communist coercion.134 Fears that Italy, and
133 George Kennan presented his views regarding the
measures necessary to contain the Soviet Union in an article
published under the nom de plume X, in Foreign Affairs, 25:4
(July 1947); 566-582. The quotation cited is from his
telegram, cited by Lawrence S. Kaplan in NATO and the United
States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers,
1988), 22.
134 James Reston, "Communist Acts Spur Congressional
Action," New York Times, 27 Feb 1948, 14.
114
possibly Norway, would succumb as had Czechoslovakia lent
impetus to considerations for international involvement, and
helped convince Congress to pass the European Cooperation
Administration bill. The Senate, however, sought to exercise
its power to ensure American involvement in the affairs of
Europe would be conducted under conditions which were
acceptable to Congress. Chief among Senate efforts was the
Vandenberg Resolution, which was passed by the Senate in mid-
1948 and established stipulations on America's European
policies. These conditions were generally aimed at directing
such policies to be managed within the framework of the
United Nations charter, and to be based on "regional and
collective arrangements as are based on continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid." Although the Senate
still harbored suspicions that America's European allies were
too willing to allow the United States to assume Europe's
rightful duty, and critical isolationist sentiment was voiced
by Senators G. Malone and J. W. Fulbright, the resolution
passed by a majority of 64 to 4.135
The Vandenberg Resolution's intent was to preclude
the United States from becoming ensnared in the role of a
global policeman by requiring that it actively counter
aggression only as a part of a multi-national effort. The
concern was not without precedent, since other major powers
in western Europe had, scarcely a decade previously, wrung
135 Kaplan, 21-24.
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their hands while Hitler won concessions through bluff and
intimidation. Attaching this legislation to America's
foreign policy, therefore, was an effort to share the onus of
defending democracy with other members of an alliance in
which the United States participated, equally as much as it
sought to restrain unilateral policy adventures on America's
part.
The issues addressed by the Vandenberg Resolution and
the debate which swirled around it also represented the early
stages of a debate over a matter which has been dubbed
"burdensharing". Burdensharing refers to the equality of any
single alliance member's contribution to an alliance,
relative to the contributions provided by other rembers of
the alliance. That no two members of an alliance would
7'ipport the goals of the alliance with equal fervor is not a
new concept, since Clausewitz referred directly to the issue
when he wrote, "We never find that a State joining in the
cause of another State takes it up with the same earnestness
as its own.",136 The question of burdensharing which was
confronted by the Vandenberg Resolution has provided the fuel
for considerable debate regarding the U.S. contributions to
forward defense arrangements, such as NATO, or Korea. In the
years to follow, burdensharing became a mask for isolationist




2. The North Atlantic Treaty
Decades of isolationist tradition conditioned the
suspicions of the U.S. legislators. These suspicions, and
the putative selfishness of the Europeans, are cited by L. S.
Kaplan as major impediments to the negotiations which led to
the North Atlantic Treaty on 09 April, 1949. The
ratification of the treaty represented the first "entangling
alliance" the United States had undertaken in peacetime, and
many government officials were reluctant to take the step
without altering the wording of the charter, particularly of
article five, to provide the United States with sufficient
political flexibility to protect its constitutional barriers
to military commitments. The initial wording of article five
called upon members of the alliance to assist other members
being attacked by external enemies, with "such action as may
be necessary [emphasis added]." U.S. ambassadors to the
meetings considered this wording too restrictive for the
United States to protect its political interests; the wording
was subsequently changed to the more ambiguous and less
restrictive call upon each member of the alliance to assist
an attacked member with "such action as it deems necessary
[emphasis added] .
The ratification of the Atlantic treaty and the
acceptance of the Vandenberg Resolution by the U.S. Senate
demonstrate two points. First, the United States as a whole,
137 Kaplan, 27-29.
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and Congress as its representatives, had become generally
aware of the degree to which American interests were tied to
European security. Noted researcher of American isolationism
L. N. Rieselbach presents evidence which suggests a linkage
between the degree of isolationist ideology demonstrated by
congressional representatives and that which was embraced by
their constituents. 138 The existance of such a linkage
further supports the argument that the U.S. populace had
largely accepted the idea of the United States as a world
power with responsibilities extending beyond its shores. The
overwhelming margin by which the Senate endorsed the
Vandenberg resolution seems to clearly indicate its decision
to embark upon an internationalist course, albeit one with
specified limitations. The large number of abstentions in
the voting, however, also seems to indicate tacit opposition
to the internationalist policies the resolution sought to
shape.
The second point which the Atlantic Treaty
illustrates, as does the Vandenberg Resolution, is that
although the United States had broken with its traditional
aversion to alliances with European countries, threads of
isolationist sentiment were still woven through the fabric of
American political thought. This is best illustrated by both
the debate which arose over the specific wording of article
five of the charter, and by the placing of conditions on
138 Rieselbach, 158-180.
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American involvement in Europe by the Vandenberg Resolution.
The U.S. government entered into the North Atlantic alliance
in the same manner as a man unable to swim would enter deep
water--only out of necessity, with one eye on an accessible
means by which to escape, and with a life preserver firmly
attached. Recognition of the importance of Europe's
political freedom to the interests of the United States could
not completely overcome deeply rooted American skepticism
regarding the intent of European capitals.
B. THE "GREAT DEBATE" OF 1951
The North Atlantic Treaty represented American
willingness to defend Western Europe, but the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) was the tangible commitment to
that defense. This organization, with its American Supreme
Allied Commander, concomitant staff, and associated support
and decision-making bodies, created a U.S. presence in Europe
to demonstrate this commitment and to physically deter
communist aggression should the need arise. The American
presence in Europe did not result without considerable
debate. C. V. Crabb stated that bipartisanship was largely
absent from American foreign policy during the period in
which NATO was formed, resulting in truculent animosities
between the Truman administration and its opponents and
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between isolationist- and internationalist-minded members of
each party.
139
NSC-68--shaped by the communist victory in China, guided
by the Soviet Union's achievements with the atomic bomb, and
adopted in 1950--endorsed massive rearmament as the surest
means for deterring Soviet troops from overrunning Europe as
early as 1952. Dissent within Truman's administration over
the specific amount by which the U.S. defense budget should
be raised to support NSC-68 had not been resolved when North
Korean troops attacked South Korea on 25 June, 1950. The
swift U.S. response to the attack calmed European doubts as
to the veracity of American support in the face of communist
aggression, but introduced new fears that America's focus
would shift from Europe to the Far East.140 As popular and
official opinion in the United States largely ascribed
control of both Red China and North Korea to the Soviet
Union, however, concerns arose in the United States that the
Korean conflict was merely a diversionary tactic by the
Soviets, and American resolve to oppose the Soviets in Europe
hardened further.
In light of the demonstrated propensity for American
governments to integrate isolationism in U.S. foreign policy
139 C. V. Crabb, Bipartisan ForeiQn Policy: Myth or
Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 86; cited by Phil
Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1985), 33.
140 Kaplan, 43-44.
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after crises, U.S. willingness to shoulder the burden of high
levels of military-related expenditures, overseas commitments
and defense build-up during this period might seem puzzling.
The combined conditions inherent in the post-war world might
serve to explain what would be an otherwise curiously high
level of support shown by American public opinion for
interventionist internationalism. First, the threat posed by
the Soviet Union to "freedom and democracy" had been clearly
demonstrated in the years following World War II, and the war
in Korea seemed to verify a Soviet intent to dominate the
world by whatever means were necessary. Second, the
intervention in Korea was undertaken under the auspices of
the United Nations, which showed the effectiveness of
international security cooperation. Third, the war indicated
the importance of America's leadership for the organization
to effectively counter aggression. Had any of these three
factors been absent, there might have emerged from this
period a much different level of support for interventionist
internationalism.
Although America's hardened resolve to oppose communist
expansion contributed to Truman's decision to augment Western
Europe's defenses with American troops, the Korean conflict
was being fought in the absence of a declared war (and was
not faring well at the time). This provided a ready-made
analogy for critics of the President's decision to place
troops in Europe--if Truman's interventionist policies were
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failing in Asia, why should they succeed in Europe? Former
president H. H. Hoover publicly broadcast, on 20 December, a
call for Truman to abandon his failing policies and "preserve
for the world this Western Hemisphere, Gibraltar of Western
Civilisation", and to place "the prime obligation of the
defense of Western Continental Europe . . . upon the nations
of Europe. ''141 Against the backdrop of war in the East,
therefore, the question of defending the West achieved even
greater significance. Forward defense was being challenged,
and isolationism was again finding its way into foreign
policy discussions.
1. Presidential Power Aspects of the Debate
Hoover's position did not call for the total
abandonment of Europe, but possibly defined the most
isolationist position of the period. The 1951 debate
regarding American troop commitments in Europe is believed by
some to actually have been a bifurcated disagreement,
consisting of the separate issues of Constitutionally-derived
presidential powers, and national interests. P. Williams
supports this theory with evidence which indicates one
portion of the disagreement--what was to become the major
opposition to Truman's European troop decision--was grounded
in a conflict between the Truman administration and Congress
over the nature and extent of Truman's powers as Commander in
141 N. A. Graebner, ed., Ideas and Diplomacy (London:
Oxford University Press, 1964), 742-745; cited by Williams,
47-49.
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Chief of the armed forces. W. Lippran stated during the
debates,
Mister Truman's troubles with Congress are self-
induced. The whole question of his rights and powers
would never have been raised had he exercised his rights
and powers with tact, with discretion, and with a broader
understanding of what is involved."1
2
Had Truman been more forthcoming in providing specifics
regarding the size of the troop commitment and its
integration into European defense as a whole, this argument
suggests, much of the debate which took place during January,
1951 might have been forestalled.143 This argument implies
Senate acceptance of interventionist policy was a given
factor, and that the issue's focus was Truman's skill at
developing political consensus.
2. National Interest Aspects of the Debate
The second part of the Senate opposition to Truman's
European troop decision involved the broader issue of the
nature of American foreign policy, and its commitment to
Europe. Senator R. Taft, an opponent of Truman's decision,
opposed maintaining a large number of U.S. forces in Europe
due to the deleterious effects which he believed a
consistently high level of defense expenditure would have
upon American society. Taft was not not an isolationist; he
advocated an expanded air force, an army capable of
142 W. Lippman, "Mr. Truman and the Constitution,"
reproduced in Congressional Record 16 January 1951, 313-314;
cited by Williams, 49.
143 Williams, 48-52.
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occasional extensions of action into Europe or Asia if
necessary, and a strictly limited number of troops stationed
in Europe to meet the expectations which had been raised
among the allies regarding American support.144 Beyond these
limitations, however, the issue of troop deployments caused
heated debate.
A major portion of the "national interest" argument
against American troops being stationed in Europe rested on
the size and length which the American troop commitment was
to assume. Secretary of State D. Acheson testified, during
Senate hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, that the United
States would not "11- expected to send substantial numbers of
troops [to Eu-:--.J as a more or less permanent contribution
to the dev~iopment of [Western Europe's] capacity to resist
[communist aggression]."" 5 Despite this reassurance,
scarcely three years had passed before the deployment of
troops and the creation of an organizational structure to
support the military aspects of the alliance portended
America's commitment to directly guaranteeing Europe's
defense. Given the perceived nature of the communist threat
throughout the postwar world, U.S. involvement in the affairs
144 Robert Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (New
York: Doubleday, 1951); and Congressional Record 05 January
1951, 59-60; are presented by Williams to support his
argument for the rationale and tenets of Taft's foreign
policy position, 54-55.
145 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in
the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 285.
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of Europe could have been restrained only with difficulty
during this period. In the words of D. P. Calleo,
Taft's situation reflects that of many American
conservatives throughout the postwar era. Their fierce
ideological hatred of Soviet communism . . . led them to
support policies that had the domestic effects they most
feared. The reasons . . . lay not only in . . . passionate
anticommunism but also in the weakness of a world, Europe
above all, that called out for American hegemony. Like
Britain's power in the nineteenth century, America's
strength was irresistibly drawn into a global vacuum.146
The U.S. nuclear monopoly was arguably a contributing
factor which led to the decision to deploy American troops to
Europe. That monopoly represented a comfortable means for
providing a protectorate for Western Europe, and possibly
encouraged the Truman administration to accept America's
postwar role of military guarantor of freedom. The Korean
conflict demonstrated the vacuity of the nuclear promise,
when political constraints and a dearth of appropriate
targets precluded the exploitation of America's technological
advantage. 147 The impermanence cf the nuclear monopoly was
demonstrated in 1949, when the Soviet Union established
itself as a nuclear power. The die, however, had been cast
146 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Fut *e
of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers, 1987), 38.
147 Michael Carver, "Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear
Age," in Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 779-783; also, Morton H. Halpern presents an
interesting discussion of factors which mitigated the U.S.
nuclear capabilities in "The Limiting Process in the Korean
War," in American Defense Policy in Perspective, ed. Raymond
G. O'Connor (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), 314-
323.
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and the United States could not easily abandon its allies.148
Troop deployments, first as part of a "trip wire" to connect
the boundaries between the Eastern and Western blocs to
American strategic arsenals, and later to maintain a forward
defense against a Warsaw Pact military adventure, became an
inexorable next step in America's decision to establish its
forward line of defense in Western Europe and Korea.
Intra-alliance security concerns demanded an American
military presence in Europe also. Only the rearmament of
Germany could, during the first half of the 1950's, provide
manpower which was necessary to establish a credible defense
in central Europe. This rearmament was fraught with
difficulty on at least two counts. First, it required the
reintroduction of former Wehrmacht troops into armed service,
a proposition which sobered many in whom the memory of the
Second World War was still fresh. Only the admission of
these troops developed a sufficient pool of manpower, and
provided an essential source of military experience, upon
which to build a new army.
149
148 Gaddis, 127-163, discusses the hardening of American
resolution regarding Europe's defense, and the increasing
reliance upon nuclear weapons to economically provide the
deterrent effect the United States needed for the defense of
Europe.
149 A thorough discussion of the soul-searching which the
German army and society underwent as the Bundeswehr rose from
the ashes of the Wehrmacht is presented by Donald Abenheim in
Reforqing the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the
West German Armed Forces (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988).
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Another issue which opposed the forming of the
Bundeswehr concerned agreements between the wartime allies
which expressly prohibited German rearmament. Soviet
opposition was not critical to the procedure, since it was to
counter Soviet aggression that the German army was reborn.
Among the European allies, however, the issue was more
important. France, notably, was predominant in its concern
for sharing the European continent with a re-militarized
Germany, but the countries of the Brussels Pact of March,
1948, as a whole, recognized the linkage between economic
recovery and the political confidence provided by military
security. 15  Against this backdrop the participation of the
United States in a European alliance understandably became
essential to the peace of mind of the Western Europeans; the
Europeans' experience with alliances against aggression
during the late 1930's had demonstrated the importance of
solidly based alliances for countering aggression. The
"Great Debate" of 1951 provided the opportunity for American
foreign policy to be debated on the Senate floor, with at
least some of the tangible costs of an internationalist
policy evident. A majority in the Senate accepted Truman's
decision to deploy significant numbers of U.S. troops to
150 Kaplan, 16-25, discusses the origins of the North
Atlantic Treaty and the political maneuvering between the
West European governments (primarily France and Britain) and
the U.S. government regarding American involvement in
European defense.
127
Europe in support of an interventionist policy, and through
that acceptance set the stage for the following decade.
C. THE MANSFIELD INITIATIVES
The intensity of the Senate debate during the first four
months of 1951 was followed by nearly a decade of general
American acquiescence to administration policies towards
NATO. Domestic support for, or at least acceptance of, the
military alliance was widespread, as was acceptance of the
threat which the alliance had been formed to counter. Most
criticisms levelled at President D. D. Eisenhower during the
last half of the 1950's dwelt upon suggestions that his
administration was too soft on communism, and that his
economically-oriented military policy, the "New Look", was
insufficient in its support of air power, strategic nuclear
forces, conventional strength, or some combination of the
three. Williams suggests an absence of isolationist
leadership during this period contributed to this lack of
opposition to the Eisenhower Administration's military
policies. Isolated critics of America's NATO commitment and
the concurrent military assistance program, such as Senator
A. Ellender, still embraced the belief that Europeans were
irresponsibly neglecting their own defense. These critics
urged the Administration to hew to a more conservative
approach to providing military support for the allies and to
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exert greater pressure on the Europeans to contribute to
their own defense.
151
Critics of internationalist policies initially lacked
significant influence in the United States, but increasing
support developed from economic concerns and from a natural
extension of those concerns--the nagging suspicion that the
Europeans were enjoying a free ride at America's expense.
America's post-war economic decline and balance-of-payments
deficit led eventually to the fall of the Bretton Woods
system, and to the decision by the administration of
President R. M. Nixon in 1971 to abandon the gold standard
and devalue the dollar.I1 2 The sagging of the U.S. economy
relative to the economies of Europe unavoidably enhanced the
perception of Europe's prosperity being derived from
America's willingness to shoulder the burden of high defense
expenditures.
These concerns began to surface with regularity during
the mid-1960's and early-1970's, as Senator M. Mansfield
began what became annual rituals of introducing resolutions
or amendments which called for reduced troop levels in
Europe. Although he was to become widely known for his
efforts to reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe, Mansfield was
151Wil iams, 112-118.
152 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(New York: Random House, 1989), 313-443, discusses the post-
war shift of economic power away from the United States, the
factors which caused it, and its political and social
implications.
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a committed internationalist--he had strongly supported
ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948, and held
fairly conventional views of the Soviet Union and the threat
it presented. Increasingly, Mansfield began to express the
belief that American resources and influence were finite and
should not be expended unless specific objectives could be
achieved. His view was that America's role in the defense of
free democracies should be limited to providing assistance
where "the people and governments most directly involved are
alive to the meaning and obligations of freedom and will
shoulder these obligations if given a helping hand", and that
a re-evaluation of U.S. goals in European defense should be
undertaken.
153
The first resolution introduced by Mansfield was aimed
simply at reducing the number of American troops in Europe.
The nonbinding resolution evolved from a report submitted by
Senator S. Symington in April, 1966 which was critical of the
attitudes and policies of the European allies.154 The timing
of the resolution also suggests that de Gaulle's decision to
withdraw France from the military organization of NATO lent
impetus to Mansfield's efforts by contributing to the
153 Mansfield's position regarding the American
commitment to European defense is discussed by Williams, 119-
209. Quote contained in M. Mansfield, The ForeiQn Policy of
the United States, speech before the American Bar
Association, Butte, Montana, June, 1941, 4; quoted by
Williams, 125.
154 M. Jewell, Senatorial Politics and ForeiQn Policy
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), 35.
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sentiment that Europe was unduly benefitting from an
inequitable arrangement. This first resolution failed as a
result of an alliance agreement which led to a reduction of
approximately 35,000 U.S. troops in Europe.
Subsequent resolutions and amendments which were intended
to bring about reductions in troop levels came to naught as
well, although for differing reasons. Symington introduced
the next challenge to America's force levels in 1968, when he
introduced an amendment to the 1969 defense procurement bill
which would have prohibited the use of funds after 31
December, 1968 to support more than 50,000 members of the
U.S. armed forces in Europe. This amendment suffered from
inopportune timing, as the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the
Soviet Union militated against reducing NATO readiness. The
next resolution, in 1969, was subsumed by a reappraisal of
American foreign policy commitments which the administration
of President R. M. Nixon had undertaken on its own
initiative. Mansfield stated his position regarding the
administration's initiative when he expressed his
astonishment that,
the 250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous
industrial resources and long military experience, [were]
unable to organise an effective military coalition to
defend themselves against 200 million Russians who are
contending at the same time with 800 million Chinese, but
must continue after 20 years to depend upon 200 million
Americans for their defence.
155
155 M. Mansfield, Conqressional Record 23 January 1970,
S430.
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The Nixon administration announcement, at the end of
1970, of its support for the status auo in Europe's defense
structure intensified Mansfield's efforts, and in May, 1971
Mansfield introduced legislation to bind the Administration
to a fifty percent reduction by the end of 1971. The
momentum of Mansfield's effort evaporated rapidly when Soviet
President L. Brezhnev issued an encouraging statement
regarding the possibility of mutual troop reductions during a
speech to the 24th Party Congress in March, 1971. A 1973
effort to achieve the same amount of troop reductions as the
May, 1971 legislation also fell victim to hopes that mutual
force reduction agreements were in the offing, although a
narrow Senate vote on the 1973 amendment represented the
greatest degree of support shown for Mansfield's troop
withdrawal efforts.156
The impact of U.S. involvement in Vietnam during this
period must also be acknowledged. The conflict in Southeast
Asia represents the highwater mark for interventionist
internationalism, and represents an important turning point
156 Williams, 184-225; and Kaplan, 130-132, 140, discuss
the Senatorial efforts to achieve troop withdrawals.
Williams focuses primarily upon the legislative politics and
domestic pressures which shaped the battle, while Kaplan
presents the debate in an intra-Alliance framework. Both
agree that the 1973 effort represents the most unified effort
by the Senate to reduce American forces in Europe, although
Kaplan explains the subsequent reduction in support for troop
withdrawal as being tied more closely to the improvement of
detente than to the need to maintain U.S. troops in Europe to
serve as 'bargaining chips' with which obtain favorable troop
reduction agreements from the Soviets.
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for interventionist policy. U.S. defense expenditures during
the Vietnam era of 1965 to 1973 climbed significantly as
America's military policy was shaped to support a foreign
policy which had as its goal countering Soviet adventurism
globally--the more passive policies of containment and
massive retaliation were abandoned in favor of a two and one-
half military with counterinsurgency and unconventional
warfare capabilities. 157
Even as the costs of interventionist foreign policies
grew, domestic support for American involvement in Vietnam
declined. A vociferous and articulate public developed a
deep antipathy towards any commitment of American troops in
the "Third World", while the elected representatives of that
public blocked antiballistic missile development, cut funds
for conventional forces and weaponry, and balked at funding
new strategic systems to replace ageing bombers and ballistic
missiles.158 Faced with domestic friction against military
rearmament, burdensharing held the potential by which
Arerican internationalism might be shored up through
increased contributions from its alliance partners, while
better East-West relations, embodied in detente, offered the
possibility that lower levels of defense expenditure would
157 Joseph C. Rallo, Defending Europe in the 1990s (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 4-6 discusses the Vietnam




suffice to sustain at least some level of overall parity with
the Soviet Union.
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The combination of detente and America's continued
commitment to Europe presented an ever-widening chasm,
however. As relations warmed between the Europeans on both
sides of the iron curtain, it became apparent that U.S.
influence in Europe was declining, while its military
commitment was not. Detente was not divisible, much to the
consternation of the United States, and the efforts of each
European member of NATO to establish its own, individual
relationship with East European countries contributed to
America's resentment with its allies. A distinct possibility
existed for isolationism to once again influence U.S. foreign
policy, until Soviet aggression in Afghanistan ushered in the
decade of the eighties, and two generally successful American
interventions occured--in Grenada in 1983, and Panama in
1989. The Afghanistan invasion served notice that the Soviet
Union was no less of an "evil empire" than it had ever been,
and that American military power was still important to
countering communist aggression. The Grenada invasion taught
the same lesson, and together with the American intervention
in Panama instilled a new confidence in the U.S. military.
Confidence in one's military is a factor which is necessary
159 Calleo, 54-60, strongly supports the argument that
the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy objective during this time
was to maintain American hegemony in Europe while seeking
better relations with the Soviet Union.
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to exercise internationalism in foreign policy, for if there
is lack of confidence in the military underpinnings of
foreign policy, then that policy relies upon either moral
suasion, or bluff. The efficacy of the former was
demonstrated in 1938. The danger of the latter is that moral
suasion can be too easily ignored by ruthless governments,
and that bluff, once discovered, is difficult to attempt
again.
It would have been difficult to state, in 1985, that the
accession of M. S. Gorbachev to the head of the Soviet Union
would have had profound implications for U.S. foreign policy.
Changes which were unleashed in the Soviet Union have spread
throughout the communist bloc, and while the final form of
the new world order has yet to be defined, it is even now
imposing change upon American foreign policy.
D. THE SOVIET/WTO THREAT AND THE RELEVANCE OF NATO
1. The Demise of the Threat
The structure of communism in Europe is crumbling.
Human desires for freedom and national identity have devoured
the steel and concrete symbol of the cold war as surely as
have the hammers and chisels which converted portions of the
Berlin Wall into souvenirs and curios. The past two years
have seen totalitarian governments, which were pledged to the
advancement of socialism, being displaced by governments
which allow multiple political parties and free elections.
Internal crises caused by nationalist identities demanding
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recognition, and by citizens demanding an end to economic
chaos, have rendered the Soviet Union's leadership of
communist Europe ineffective, at best.1
60
The communist bloc formerly was militarily
represented by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and much
of the difference between European and American contributions
to the defense of Europe was a natural extension of the
disparate European and American perceptions of the threat
presented by the WTO and its guiding power, the Soviet Union.
Kaplan speaks of this divergence of views, and presents it as
an explanation for many of the fissures in the Atlantic
Alliance, including the contrast in military expenditures for
defense, the variance in perspective regarding detente and
its benefits, and other facets of political and economic
relations with the Soviet Union.
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The gathering collapse of the Soviet economy, the
defection of East European governments from the communist
camp, and the probable inability of the Soviets to unite the
WTO sufficiently to form a threat to the democracies of the
West have given rise to the popular belief that the Cold War
is now over, and Democracy has won. Surveys taken by the
160 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-communist Nationalism," in
Foreign Affairs 68:4 (Winter 1989/90): 1-25.
161 Kaplan, 115-184, presents an excellent discussion of
the NATO alliance and of the issues which have created
tensions among its members from the 1970's through the mid-
1980's. Although it is predominantly from the American
viewpoint, his book contains elements of both U.S. and
European perspectives.
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Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1974, 1978, and 1982
indicated an overwhelming majority of popular support to
maintain the U.S. commitment to NATO at the levels which
existed at the time of the polls. These attitudes
corresponded with the generally unfavorable public perception
of the Soviet Union, and the high level of support popular
opinion evinced for U.S. intervention if Soviet troops
invaded Western Europe. W. Schneider discusses these opinion
surveys, and the relatively more
internationalist/interventionist position taken by
presidential administrations compared to public opinions.
162
The surveys cited generally indicate a high degree of popular
adherence to conventional opinions regarding the Soviet Union
and the syllogism of NATO--the Soviet Union threatens the
democracies of Europe, defending Western Europe supports the
interests of the United States, therefore an American
presence in Europe is necessary to counter Soviet threats to
the interests of the United States. The changing situation
in Europe is now bringing the validity of that syllogism
under fire.
The military capabilities of the WTO are declining.
East Germany was, until recently, the mainstay of non-Soviet
support in the WTO, yet for the Soviet bloc it has simply
162 William Schneider, "Peace and Strength: American
Public Opinion on National Security," in The Public and
atlantic Defense ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, Publishers, 1985), 321-
364.
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ceased to exist as it unashamedly rushed out of the communist
alliance to unite with West Germany. Soviet forces are, or
will be, withdrawing from what is now the eastern part of
Germany, as well as from other European countries, at the
behest of the Soviets' erstwhile allies, who are conducting
their own force drawdowns; in January, 1990 Colonel-General
N. Chervov, a Soviet policy spokesman for the WTO, announced
the imminent disbanding of the WTO's supreme political
163body. The declining cohesion of the WTO, coupled with the
reduced military strength of its members, appears to
substantially mitigate the likelihood of a military assault
being launched across the countries of Eastern Europe by the
Soviets and by Soviet-directed forces.
The popular American perception of this reduced
likelihood is reflected by a recent CBS News/New York Times
survey. In May, 1990, only thirty-three percent of U.S.
adults polled agreed with the statement that the Soviet
Union's goal was world domination, compared to an eighty-one
percent agreement expressed by polled adults in 1950. The
survey results further indicated higher education and greater
attentiveness to world events contributed to a more favorable
opinion of the Soviet Union.16 Legislators also point to the
communist bloc's degeneration as evidence that the threat to
163 The Economist, "The Warsaw Pact -- Vanishing,"
314:7639 (27 January 1990): 54.
164 Michael Oreskes, "American Fear of Soviets Declines,
Survey Finds," New York Times, 30 May 1990, A12.
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Western interests do not merit the same levels of economic or
political expenditure which they previously did. The changed
threat to American interests abroad compelled Senate Armed
Forces Committee chairman S. Nunn, in an address to the
Senate, to urge the administration of President G. Bush to
begin plans to reduce the American troop strength in Europe
to a level between 75,000 to 100,000 within five years.
165
2. The Economic Relevance of NATO
Some arguments for reducing the U.S. contribution to
NATO focus largely upon economic interests, and these
arguments are commonly couched in references to
burdensharing. According to burdensharing arguments America
contributes excessively, relative to its European allies, to
the defense of Europe, whereas the European members of NATO
are too willing to enjoy a "free ride" and allow the United
States to shoulder the majority of the economic burden for
Western Europe's defense. Data is available which supports
this contention--a report submitted by the Defense
Burdensharing Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services
cites figures which show U.S. expenditures on defense, stated
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), to be more
than twice that of the average for the non-U.S. NATO members,
a condition which has existed almost without exception for
165 Congress, Senate, Senator Nunn, 101st Cong., 2d
sess., Congressional Record (19 April 1990), vol. 136, pt.
43, S4451-S4452.
139
every year since 1950. Even considering that the entire
U.S. defense budget does not directly contribute to NATO, the
presence of expensive, strategically-oriented items in the
defense budget, such as the B-2 bomber, the rail-mobile ICBM,
and the Trident submarine, which are justified in terms of
deterring Soviet aggression in Europe, cannot avoid
increasing popular misconceptions about the U.S. contribution
to Europe's freedom.
Pressures for unilateral force reductions have as
their wellspring perceptions of excessive American efforts to
defend Europe while the European NATO members enjoy social
and economic gains which small defense expenditures make
possible. Congressional efforts to reconcile American
interests with force reduction pressures have recently taken,
in response to the pressures which have resulted from those
perceptions, the form of amendments which attempt to more
equitably divide the costs and responsibilities associated
with Europe's defense. Chief among these is an amendment
which would respond to force reductions undertaken by the
European NATO members with commensurate reductions of U.S.
forces.167 The message is elementary to the argument of
burdensharing--it is increasingly difficult for the U.S.
166 Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report
of the Defense Burdensharing Panel, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1988, committee print 23, 21-23.
167 Congress, Senate, Senator McCain, 101st Cong., 2d
sess., Congressional Record (18 June 1990), vol. 136, pt.
105, S9118-$9119.
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government to justify to its populace a U.S. commitment to
provide higher levels of security for its European allies
than they are willing to provide for themselves.
The popular conviction that the Eastern bloc no
longer poses a serious threat to the West, inL.ig reductions
in American defence spending possible is responsible also for
the popular concept of the "peace dividend". Congressional
resolutions and amendments have been forwarded which
encourage this perception by calling for laudable uses for
funds diverted from defense spending; tax reduction
proposals, social welfare programs, deficit reduction
measures, and prison reform proposals are but a few of the
areas which would directly benefit from reduced defense
spending, according to these legislative actions.168 To an
American populace which has been conditioned to the Soviet
Union as the pre-eminent threat to American interests, the
siren's song of the peace dividend is completely logical.
The Soviet leadership is at the helm of a country which,
beyond its nuclear capabilities, increasingly loses
credibility as a threat to democracy as its economy grinds
168 Congress, Senate, Senator Packard, 101st Cong., 2d
sess., Congressional Record, (21 March 1990), vol. 136, pt.
31, H959; and Congress, Senate, Senator Lagomarsio, 101st
Cong., 2d sess., ConQressional Record, (24 April 1990), vol.
136, pt. 46, S51231 and (27 April 1990), vol. 136, pt. 49,
S5205. These citations represent only a brief survey of
Congressional initiatives for distributing the fruits of the
"peace dividend" to worthy causes. Many more are available,
but to include them here would not necessarily contribute to
the argument.
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slower each day and its fractious republics openly chafe
against the tenuous reins of control still held by the
Kremlin. Now that the Russian bear seems to have no teeth,
why spend the same amount of money to defend against it as
was spent when it was thought to be fierce and omnipotent?
3. The Military Relevance of NATO
The apparent demise of the Soviet bloc as a clearly
defined threat, however, has led to another, less obvious
threat. D. Abshire referred to this threat when he stated,
We must realize that the forces of instability in Eastern
Europe that led to World War I are once again at work.
Our military strategy which today is designed to counter
a Red army blitzkrieg through the Fulda Gap, must in the
future ensure that history does not pick up where it left
off in 1914 . . . . NATO is not obsolete but must take on
the new mission of maintaining both stability and
democratization in Eastern Europe.
169
The danger is historically unique--no nuclear-armed
superpower has been threatened with collapse or civil war
before. Rampant nationalism has already caused significant
fighting within the Soviet Union, and Abshire's statement
reflects the well-founded caution with which students of
European history should approach any breakdown of long-
standing political establishments in the Baltic and East
European region. This caution notwithstanding, opponents of
American involvement in Europe focus primarily upon the
reduced danger of military aggression posed by the political
169 David Abshire, "Strategy in a Changing World,"
printed in Congressional Record, (06 February 1990), vol.
136, pt. 9, S926-S927.
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divergence within the WTO in arguments for reducing the
American presence in NATO.
Contradictions between the estimates of Soviet
capabilities forwarded by the Defense Intelligence Agency and
the Central Intelligence Agency increase the difficulty of
defining the true threat posed by the Soviet bloc. Added to
these contradictions is an unbalanced American media focus--
during the same period in which Gorbachev's promised
reductions in military expenditures and willingness to
negotiate further reductions have been highly publicized, the
Soviet Union still out-produced NATO two-fold in tanks, and
ten-fold in artillery shells, while maintaining and
modernizing its weapons stockpiles in Europe. 17  Uncertainty
within the American government regarding the threat which
NATO faces in Europe cannot resolve a similar uncertainty
among America's population, nor can it adequately refute
arguments which question the validity of the threat which is
used to justify a large U.S. presence in Europe.
Another argument against the military relevance of
NATO is based upon the limited cooperation achieved within
NATO in dealing with out-of-area problems, the most apparent
of which is the Persian Gulf crisis. The NATO charter does
not allow for operations out of the defined NATO area, which
relegates NATO to the role of being a conveniently available
170 International Security Council, "Bring on the B-
Team," New York Times, 18 July 1990, A15.
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vehicle for consultations amongst long-standing allies when
out-of-area problems are addressed. As a result of the
qualifications placed upon the alliance, military cooperation
among the NATO allies in out-of-area conflicts have required
either unilateral contributions from European countries, or
coordination within frameworks other than NATO.171 The
leadership of the United States, combined with its mobile and
highly developed armed forces, serves to place America in the
position of forging ahead to protect interests which are
common to its allies as well as itself, and attempting to
develop international support for its actions enroute. In
the case of the Persian Gulf, this procedure has created the
very real possibility that, unless the events which follow
American intervention against Iraq's aggressive expansionism
are conducive to positive perceptions of America's allies by
the American populace, a severe backlash of isolationist
influence on American foreign policy may result.
171 Alan Riding, "NATO Struggling to Redefine Itself,"
New York Times, 24 September 1990, A5. The Western European
Union is one European structure which has been used for
cooperation between West European countries supporting
operations in the Persian Gulf. NATO's relevance is also
being challenged by suggestions from the Soviet Union and
France that it and the WTO be subsumed by a single
organization under the aegis of the thirty-five nation
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The
unprecedented unity and swift action of the United Nations
(albeit aided by swifter U.S. leadership) also presents that
organization as a potential alternate to the geographically
restricted NATO.
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E. THE IMPACT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
The Persian Gulf conflict has introduced the issues
surrounding U.S. commitments in Europe into the Middle East.
Despite the geographical difference, the questions remain
largely the same--does the United States contribute
excessively, relative to its allies, to supporting interests
which are common to all? The policy question of the Cold
War, "Should the United States trade Chicago for Berlin?" has
become the policy question of the Middle East, "Should the
United States sacrifice American soldiers to protect Japanese
(or German, or Saudi, or French, etc.) oil?" This
oversimplification is designed to elicit a visceral response
from the "man on the street", but does so by ignoring
important factors, such as the strategic interests of the
United States and the nature of the global economy.
Conversely, the perception upon which this question is based,
and its portent for the future of U.S. foreign policy, can be
ignored only at the peril of American interests.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979
elicited the Carter Doctrine, which identified the Persian
Gulf and its oil reserves as an area of strategic interest to
the United States. Subsequent events, including the Iran-
Iraq war and its affect upon the safe passage of tankers
carrying oil from the Persian Gulf, brought about another
issue which was deleterious to American support for U.S.-
sponsored operations in the gulf. The difference in the
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degree to which the United States and its allies were
dependent upon oil shipped out of the Persian Gulf
contributed to American feelings of being manipulated as
well, but only through discounting the nature of modern
global economics. The global demand for oil is relatively
inelastic, and competition for resources characterizes some
aspects of relations between industrialized countries.
Although Japan, or certain European countries, might obtain a
higher percentage of their oil from fields which have been
affected by the Persian Gulf crisis than does the United
States, the interruption of their customary supplies forces
them to seek sources which have not been disrupted. This
places the Japanese and Europeans in more direct competition
with the United States for oil from sources which otherwise
would have been primary suppliers for the United States. The
competition forces higher prices, and the U.S. economy
suffers as a result. U.S. interests in the Gulf region,
therefore, do not necessarily derive from its own oil supply,
but rather from the impact which competition for the oil
supply in the world at large can have on the U.S. economy.
Another portion of opposition to U.S. intervention in the
Persian Gulf resides in the fiscal burden borne by the United
States in securing safe passage for oil tankers. Estimates
of the cost of American escort operations in the Persian Gulf
during late 1987 placed the Pentagon's burden at $20 million
per month. This unilateral expenditure compelled the Senate
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to pass, by a margin of ninety-five to two, a non-binding
resolution which called upon the administration of President
R. Reagan to negotiate reimbursement agreements with the oil-
producing and oil-purchasing countries which benefitted from
America's Persian Gulf operations. In an interesting
reversal of Washington's foreign policy warning nearly two
centuries earlier, European allies of the United States
supported some aspects of the American naval escort
operations in the region, but were careful to dissociate
themselves from American policies, citing concerns that U.S.
decisions could involve the Europeans in a war which was not
of their making. 173 Cooperation between the United States and
its European allies was put off for nearly a year, and when
it did finally occur, the impetus which brought it about was
the ubiquitous and indiscriminate threat posed by mines, not
the principle of free navigation endorsed by the United
States.174 This apparent reluctance to cooperate with U.S.
efforts from America's allies, all of whom clearly benefitted
from U.S. force projection, further exacerbates domestic
172 Helen Dewar, "Senate Calls for Beneficiaries of Gulf
Escorts to Defray U.S. Costs," Washington Post, 08 October
1987, AIO.
173 Edward Cody, "London, Paris, Bonn Back U.S. Response;
Europeans Keep Ships Separate," Washington Post, 20 October
1987, A26.
114 Edward Cody, "U.S., Europeans Consider Joint Gulf
Mine-clearing Operation," Washinqton Post, 10 September 1988,
A12.
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American frustrations with inequitable defense burdens in the
Alliance.
Restraints which preclude America's allies from providing
direct and obvious support to U.S. efforts in the Persian
Gulf have contributed even further to domestic
dissatisfaction with U.S. support for European defense,
resulting in tangible efforts to impose cooperation upon
allies who seem reluctant to support mutually beneficial
actions. An amendment proposed by Representative D. Bonior
in September, 1990 would requires Japan to pay the full cost
of U.S. armed forces stationed in Japan, including their
salaries, with a ten percent reduction in troops occurring in
every year that Japan refused to pay. Congressional support
for the Bonior amendment sharply criticizes Japan's "flexible
constitution, which conveniently allows the Japanese to let
others fight and pay for world order, world peace and the
recognition of basic human rights", and also censured Germany
for failing to actively support United Nations efforts in the
Persian Gulf. Japan, and Europe as a whole, obtain a
greater proportion of their oil from the Persian Gulf region,
the argument states, and Germany and Japan are two of the
world's strongest industrial economies; it is unfair for the
United States, the world's greatest debtor nation, to worsen
its financial problems simply because no other nation is
I7 R. W. Apple Jr., "Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized For
Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost," New York Times, 13 September
1990, 1.
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willing to exhibit the leadership and sacrifice necessary to
counter Saddam Hussein's aggression.176 Congressional and
domestic pressure combined to force Bush and his
Administration to exert political pressure upon U.S. allies
to ante up with financial support for united efforts in the
Persian Gulf. The allies have provided these contributions
in the form of direct subsidization of U.S. troop deployment
and naval patrol costs, and in financial support for
countries which have been deleteriously affected by the
United Nations embargo of Iraq. If the confrontation in
the Gulf region deteriorates into active hostilities, fiscal
support is unlikely to assuage American anger at bearing the
brunt of the punishment in a Middle East war.
Regardless of how such a war might be resolved, the
degree to which American presence in the area predominates
would inevitably result in a large number of American
casualties. Resentment over the ineffectual military
contributions of some allies, as Japan or Germany, would then
be likely to emerge from an angry U.S. populace.
Isolationist sentiment could easily find in that resentment
the fuel it needs to become an influential force in American
foreign policy. In this scenario can be seen the same
176 Robert E. Hunter, "Sharing the Burden in the Gulf,"
New York Times, 16 August 1990, A21.
17 R. W. Apple Jr., "Bush Urges Allies to Bear 'Their
Fair Share' of Costs of Military Effort in Gulf," New York
Times, 31 August 1990, Al.
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pattern as was present during the interwar period from 1919
to 1930, when American isolationist sentiment grew as
America's World War I allies defaulted on their war loans.
The current domestic pressure on the American government to
counter allegedly unfair trade practices with damaging tariff
barriers would be likely to gain momentum from the backlash
of isolationist sentiment emerging from a Middle East war,
and follow the pattern of the interwar period even more
closely.
Another parallel to the interwar period can be
established by substituting for the label "arms merchant" the
more current term "oil merchant". Just as the books
Merchants of Death and Iron, Blood and Profits sought, in
1934, to define the connection between the U.S. munitions
industry and American participation in World War I, future
historical studies will seek, if a conflict in the Persian
Gulf occurs, to establish the connection between the
petroleum industry and U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf.
As described above, the connection does exist, but largely
due to the global nature modern, industrialized economies.
F. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONALISM VERSUS ISOLATIONISM
The emergent fact from post-Cold War debates is that the
international order is changing. Upon that observation,
however, hinges the entire debate regarding America's role in
the changing international order. Nearly all elements of the
past one hundred years of U.S. foreign policy are present in
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the current debates; isolationists endorse protectionist
trade barriers, such as those which impaired the American
economy during the 1920's and early 1930's. Such barriers
could do even more damage today, as global interdependence is
even greater. Another manifestation of isolationist
sentiment is found in pressure for unilateral reduction of
foreign involvement, and some isolationists attempt to garner
domestic support for such reductions by making social welfare
programs the beneficiaries of reduced defense expenditures.
Withdrawing funds from externally-oriented programs, either
defense or foreign aid, and putting those funds to use
internally is an inherently isolationist act, unless the
reduced foreign expenditure is balanced with a mechanism by
which to ensure U.S. influence is still exerted in the arena
of international relations. One such mechanism might be a
dynamic foreign policy firmly grounded in realpolitik, in
which American interests are specifically defined and
pragmatically supported. Such policy should recognize the
importance of international stability and justice, and
promote such values unreservedly.
Another important mechanism for maintaining American
influence abroad could be a highly mobile military force,
operating in a new and more specialized role within current
military alliances and/or international organizations. The
structure of such organizations should be more streamlined,
with clearly defined responsibilities for providing support
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to joint actions conducted under the aegis of the
organization. This would help reduce the propensity of the
United States to dash to the trumpets with saber drawn, while
other countries with the same interests temporize, or
downplay their own role.
Interventionalist internationalist are also present,
arguing for a continued high level of foreign commitment by
the United States, and presenting compelling arguments that
the ill-defined shape of the present international
environment does not contain sufficient stability to warrant
complacency. This group sees continued relevance in a
strong, forward-deployed defense which includes nuclear
deterrent forces until such time as internal political
instability has been resolved by all major powers. Any
approach to securing national interests other than the one
followed by the United States for the past forty years
represents a possible danger of weakness in American foreign
policy to this group.
Non-interventionist internationalists are present as
well, arguing for maintaining the U.S. presence in
international relations, but only within the framework of a
supra-national organization, such as the United Nations. The
importance of concerted action against aggression by the
United Nations has been amply demonstrated by the Persian
Gulf crisis, and bodes well for future cooperation along
these lines. An inescapable fact, however, is the importance
152
of American military power and political leadership in
achieving that unity. The dynamics of international politics
argues against the likelihood of completc success being
achieved by status auo organizations, such as the United
Nations. Increasing pressures, such as nationalism,
population increases, and resource depletion will only serve
to increase the difficulties of supra-national organizations.
Until those inherent instabilities are resolved, strong
leadership, supported by strong military capabilities, will
be an important commodity. Additionally, the measures
discussed above regarding improvements to international
organizations in which the United States participates could
provide additional benefits by developing domestic support
for an internationalist program.
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V. CONCLUSION
The present crisis in the Persian Gulf has revived
perennial questions of American statecraft and national
security policy. The efficacy of peace and war are joined
with a searching for America's appropriate role in a vastly
changed world. This debate makes little sense, though,
without some careful consideration of the course and
evolution of American statecraft and strategy in its
entirety. The present study has sought to examine the
evolution of a central theme of U.S. diplomacy and strategy,
that of isolationism, in its most recent manifestations. As
the debate in this country turns on the wisdom or folly of
warfare in a post-containment, post-cold war world,
participants in the argument make use of ideas and positions
the origins of which are shrouded for most in an unknown and
seemingly unknowable past. This fact notwithstanding, one
can surely argue that American statecraft has evolved over
the past two years with certain basic tenets underlying
nearly all events. The reluctance to engage in traditional
statecraft and strategy, the overarching wish to avoid
entangling alliances linked to the blood feuds of the courts
has revealed itself in episodes through the history of this
republic. Nonetheless, the isolationism of 1799 and 1990 are
by no means fully identical. Rather, this sentiment in its
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modern form has passed through several distinct phases, which
are recapitulated below.
A. WASHINGTON'S ADDRESS--THE TAPROOT OF ISOLATIONISM
American isolationist sentiment is based heavily on the
foreign policy statement which President G. Washington
bequeathed to the American nation. Although he acknowledged
the importance of economic ties in his farewell address, he
cautioned the young American government against political
ties with the European powers. The world of 1796 allowed
America's physical isolation from Europe--geographical
insulation and technology which was, by today's standards,
primitive bestowed an ad-'ntage upon the United States which
helped it to defeat Britain's superior military power in the
American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.
Additionally, the danger of becoming involved in a war which
was not of America's choosing as a result of Napoleon's
political ambitions loomed large at the end of the eighteenth
century and lent even greater impetus to American desires to
keep European quarrels far from America's shores.
Except for a brief flirtation with imperial ambitions
involving Cuba and the Phillipines during the latter part of
the nineteenth century, the United States hewed closely to
the line Washington drew. The Monroe Doctrine, in 1823,
sought to counter European designs on New World countries by
establishing U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere as an
interest which America was willing to defend with military
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force. That the United States was committed to the tenets of
the Monroe Doctrine was clearly demonstrated later, when that
doctrine was cited to justify American intervention against
British, German and Italian influence in Venezuela ii. 1902.
The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, framed by
President T. Roosevelt in 1904, furthered the U.S. goal of
keeping European influence out of the New World by stating
America's intent to exercise an international police power in
case of wrong-doing by powers in the Western Hemisphere which
might otherwise compel European intervention. The Roosevelt
corollary was later separated from the Monroe Doctrine by the
Clark Memorandum of March, 1930, which specified the tenets
of the doctrine which the United States government intended
to uphold, but the corollary's demonstration of America's
commitment to averting European encroachment upon America's
sphere of influence is important to recognize. Through these
policies, the United States established vehicles through
which geographical expressions of isolationism would be
protected and European intervention in "America's hemisphere"
might be forestalled.
Even the short imperialistic foray of the United States
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has
been argued by some to have been motivated more by the need
to secure vital commerce and strategic trade routes (the
approaches to the future trans-isthmian canal and the trade
routes to China) than by a desire to obtain colonial
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possessions. Geographical insulation, dissociation from the
cultural and institutional mores of the European powers,
preoccupation with continental expansion, and technological
conditions cooperated to encourage the United States to
eschew "entangling alliances" with Europe in the 120 years
which separated George Washington's farewell address from
President W. Wilson's declaration of war. On the surface,
very little difference seems to separate the isolationist
policies of 1796 from those of 1917, yet the policies of the
eighteenth century insulated the United States from the
Napoleonic wars of Europe, while the twentieth century
policies, in the very best case, failed to provide that
insulation and in the worst case, ensured the U.S. would
become embroiled in bloody carnage. It is important,
therefore, to recognize the difference between American
isolationism of 1917 and its predecessor of 1796.
B. PRE-WORLD WAR I: TRADITIONAL ISOLATIONISM
World War I did not initially shake American isolationist
attitudes. Traditional isolationism enabled American
business to profit from the European war from 1914 until 1917
without suffering the political or moral disadvantages of
becoming directly involved in the war; although popular
opinion was generally sympathetic to the Entente, it was even
more adamantly isolationist. The population centers of the
industrialized areas along the Eastern seaboard of the United
States represented the most internationalist elements of
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popular American political opinion, but isolationist
sympathies predominated throughout the country. As stated
earlier, only the publication of the sensational Zimmermann
telegram in 1917 sufficiently united the more stringently
isolationist elements, which were located generally in rural,
western, and southwestern America, to support American
involvement in World War I.
Elite opinion in Wilson's administration advocated
American intervention on behalf of the Entente for the
purpose of preserving a European "balance-of-power" which was
more closely aligned with American interests. Both E. M.
House, as the President's personal confidant, and Secretary
R. Lansing advocated U.S. participation out of sympathies
they held for the democracies of the Entente. Yet, as G. F.
Kennan points out, U.S. political thought did not fully
understand how important Europe's balance of power was to
America's security--as Kennan stated it, the United States "
entered the right war for the wrong reason.''I s
D. F. Fleming also refutes the argument that America
entered the war to defend the European balance of power from
another perspective, arguing that America's entry into the
war occurred while the war was still tied in stalemate, and
before the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March, 1918, released
large numbers of German troops for action against the Entente
178 Kennan, 62-66.
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powers on the Western Front.17 Nor did popular American
opinion, and its manifestation through its elected
representatives, significantly ascribe to the view that a
specific political system in Europe was essential to American
interests. If the balance-of-power argument is insufficient
to explain the demise of American isolationism, another
answer must be found.
German actions which compromised America's neutrality
"rights" were the specific motivations which provided the
impetus necessary for the United States to unite sufficiently
to go to war. Unrestricted submarine warfare was the only
means by which Imperial Germany could hope to inflict upon
the Entente powers the same strangulation which Germany was
suffering at their hands, but it directly challenged the
ultimatum which Wilson had delivered regarding American
citizens and vessels. The question of international law is
moot--Imperial Germany's U-boat campaign did violate
recognized international law, but no more so than British
actions during this period, actions which included the mining
of the North Sea and English Channel, taking liberties in
defining contraband, deceptively flying U.S. flags aboard
British merchant vessels, or arming those merchant vessels
and ordering them to attack any submarine on sight (which,
according to international law, obviated the vessels' non-
combatant status). The Wilson administration's avowed
179 Fleming, 226-228.
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commitment to neutrality under the aegis of international
law, therefore, was flawed by being based on pillars which
both Britain and Germany found necessary to topple in order
for each country to further its own war effort.
Wilson's declaration that Imperial Germany would be held
strictly accountable for any harm to any American citizen
traveling aboard any vessel, without any complimentary
restrictions upon the travel of American citizens aboard the
vessels of powers engaged in hostilities, was a statement
which strikes historians in the late twentieth century as
supreme naivete; the presence of an American citizen aboard
any merchant vessel was expected to served as an inoculation
against attack by a submarine which could have no forewarning
of the American's presence. Germany's early acquiescence to
Wilson's objections to submarine warfare contributed to the
conviction that Germany's actions were unacceptable, and when
the German Kaiser succumbed to internal pressures and renewed
Germany's U-boat campaign, it was done largely out of the
hope that the pressure it would place on the Entente would
assist in securing peace negotiations which were favorable to
Germany, and with full realization that such action would
most likely draw the United States into the war on the side
of the Entente.
While the Wilson administration's defense of American
neutrality rights was conveniently pro-Entente, the accident
of geographic advantage arguably justified such
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circumstances; although elements within Wilson's circle of
advisors clearly supported the cause of the Entente, efforts
to trade with the Central Powers were still allowed by the
Wilson administration. That these efforts came to naught
resulted more from Britain's domination of the sea lanes and
of American trade, than a conscious American decision to
handicap Germany. Wilson's efforts to ensure the safety of
American citizens led to his decision to hold Germany
accountable for injuries incurred by American's as a result
of German submarine attacks, regardless of the nationality of
the vessel upon which the American injured might have been
embarked. The affront to the neutral rights of the United
States which resulted from Germany's decision to proceed with
unrestricted submarine warfare against the U.S. protestati-ns
provided the crisis which overcame isolationist sentiment,
and the United States entered into the European conflict.
The failure of pre-World War I neutrality lies primarily
in the administration's failure to recognize that American
interests could not be served by America's refusal to
participate in shaping international relations. A more
pragmatic approach by U.S. diplomacy which accepted a role in
a politically, economically, and technologically changed
world might not have been likely to have prevented the
outbreak of the war, but could arguably have created more
favorable conditions at its end than the "victor's peace"
which the Paris peace conferences and the Treaty of
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Versailles imposed upon Germany. As the pre-intervention
period of 1914 to 1917 unfolded, however, America's
involvement with the democracies ensured it would defend its
neutrality through policies which were advantageous to the
Entente powers. This choice forced the United States to be
increasingly at odds with the Alliance powers, and virtually
guaranteed America could not avert its progress along a path
which would eventually lead it to Saint Mihiel, Meuse-
Argonne, and Versailles.
C. PRE-WORLD WAR II: REVISIONIST ISOLATIONISM
.fter World War I, the world again seemed safe for
democracy to flourish, but the United States once more
retrzcted into its own hemisphere, and eschewed involvement
abroad. Congress refused to allow the United States to
participate in international organizations, such as the
Leagie of Nations or the World Court, which held the
potential to avoid or prevent war through arbitration or
mutual security. Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928
gair.3d Senate ratification, it was able to do so only after
U.S. Secretary of State F. B. Kellogg assured the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the United States could not
be bound by the pact to participate in sanctions or
enforcement of its tenets. The victory which ratification of
the pact represented for internationalists was based upon by
the opportunity which it held to shape American opinion in
the event the pact was violated by an aggressive power.
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The Senate's refusal to allow America's participation in
other international organizations which supported
international cooperation to achieve disarmament and/or avert
war through peaceful mediation of disputes, derived largely
from the same concerns which guided Washington's warning in
his farewell address. Just as the first president feared an
alliance between the United States and a European power would
entangle the United States in a war which grew out of the
avarice of the European governments, the American Senate
feared, in the post-war period, that American participation
in any international security structure would pull America
once more into the inferno from which it had just emerged.
The perception grew among both popular and elite groups that
American blood had been spilled due to the perfidy of greedy
industrialists and financiers supported by the U.S.
government, or due to the "ambition, rivalship, interest,
humor, or caprice" of inter-European relations, and that
perception gained credence as both historians and a Senate
investigation presented well-supported arquments to that
effect.
Other manifestations of isolationism which wreaked havoc
during the inter-war period were the various trade and tariff
barriers the U.S. government erected. Notable among the
actions which represented isolationist influence upon trade
policy were the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act in 1922 (which
was intended to protect specific industrial and agricultural
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production), artificial stimulation of the American shipping
industry (which was intended to end U.S. dependence on
foreign bottoms), and ultimately, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
in 1930 (which was meant to allow struggling American
industry to recover from America's economic depression
unencumbered by the burden of international competition.
These actions were well-intentioned efforts to support
American commercial and agricultural interests against
foreign competitors, but ultimately contributed to the
collapse of the world economy in 1929, and slowed the global
economy's recovery thereafter.
Difficulties with reparations and war debts arose from
the shattered global economy, and the default of England and
France on their war debts to the United States in 1932
contributed even further to popular perceptions that the
United States had somehow been "duped" into fighting the
Europeans' war. The Nye Committee added to the outrage felt
against Europe as it sought to demonstrate that
industrialists and financiers had perpetrated a deception
upon the U.S. public and administration which led to war.
Against this backdrop, isolationism could do nothing other
than grow. Some American political leaders who resented the
expenditure in blood and capital which intervention in the
European war had drawn out of the United States sought to
extract lessons from the intervention, and the resulting
neutrality legislation represented even greater refinement of
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isolationism than the pre-intervention period of World War I
had seen. The arms trade, which was forwarded by the Nye
Committee as being a significant factor for American
involvement in the 1917-1918 conflict, especially became the
focus of severe restrictions in legislative efforts to ensure
the experience would not be repeated.
The advantage of retrospect reveals an acute irony--
efforts to extract lessons from the failure of isolationism
in 1917 were directed by isolationist thought. Isolationism
had impeded U.S. foreign policy at the outset of the war,
when American influence might otherwise have furthered the
cause of international peace and prosperity through pragmatic
application of America's influence in support of its own
interests. Yet the issue of isolation's worthlessness as a
guiding principle in American policy held little sway; the
perception was that a flawed isolationist policy had caused
the United States to go to war, not that U.S. policy had
brought on American involvement due to the inherent flaw of
isolationism. Against this perspective, the Neutrality Acts
were a perfectly logical response--if the weaknesses of
traditional isolationism had forced the United States to go
to war because American interests became too entangled with
the interests of belligerents, then preventing that
entanglement should prevent America's involvement in another
war.
165
The initial stages of World War II lent some credibility
to revisionist isolationism. The powers of Europe were on
the march again--greedy for power, hungry for territory,
jealous of each other, they underscored every conviction
which held that a reserved attitude towards Europe best
supported America's agenda. As with World War I, American
opinion supported the Allied cause over that of the Axis
powers, but not to the extent of giving them any backing
other than encouragement; quite probably, the U.S. reluctance
to lend its weight to the cause of Britain and France did
more to pave the road which led to the appeasement at Munich
in 1938 than did President F. D. Roosevelt's urging the
European powers to negotiate.
Roosevelt's struggle to make inroads into the provisions
of the Neutrality Acts was necessarily restrained by domestic
considerations. America's recovery was his first priority,
and Roosevelt's need to maintain a consensus in Congress for
recovery programs precluded him from undertaking neutrality
revision as aggressively as the international situation might
have warranted. Isolationists also used Roosevelt's
internationalist policies to attribute to the President the
intent to involve America in Europe's war. Events supported
Roosevelt's efforts, however, and made possible the "cash-
and-carry" and Lend-Lease bills which circumvented many of
the restrictions which were placed upon support to Britain by
the legislation which had evolved from the lessons drawn from
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the failure of traditional isolationism. The final,
overwhelming blow to pre-World War II revisionist
isolationism came with dreadful clarity in December, 1941.
D. THE COLD WAR: INTERVENTIONIST INTERNATIONALISM
The post-World War II relaxation again found the United
States returning to its own hemisphere, but with less
isolationist conviction than before the war. America had
marched into the war reluctantly, but when the war ended the
country had strode forth as the only true superpower. The
economy was strong, the country was united, industry was
intact, and the United States had sole possession of the most
terrible weapon on the face of the Earth.
The World War I model of isolation fell victim to the
caprice of Mars, illustrating the fallacy of a policy which
contains the expectation of conducting "business as usual"
during a war between major powers when the interruption of
that business serves the strategic interests of the warring
powers. The propensity of the U.S. to serve as the "arsenal
of democracy" made the supply lines which linked American
industry with the Entente soldier important targets for
German interdiction, and inevitably drew the United States
into the war.
The World War II model of isolation had fared no better.
Technology had shrunk the world to such a degree that
geographic isolation no longer provided sanctuary. The
notion that drawing into a hemispheric shell and refusing all
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intercourse with warring powers would insulate a resource-
laden continent from the covetousness of a fascist dictator
was proven false, and even as Roosevelt and his
administration sought to overcome the revisionist
isolationism of post-World War I America, forces were in
motion over which the United States had no control, unless it
had been willing to embark upon the dynamic and coercive
foreign policy which popular sentiment and legislative
pressure had previously prohibited.
The period following both wars saw America returning to
preoccupation with its own affairs. Whereas the post-World
War I era provided nearly twenty years before conflict once
again stalked the Earth, the post-World War II era was almost
immediately rent with the ideological conflict between
communism and democracy. Isolationism did not have an
opportunity to re-emerge before American society was again
faced with a vital external threat. That the United States
was the only industrialized country capable of rebuffing
communist efforts in war-ravaged Europe was clearly evident,
and the nature of the communist threat--a political challenge
backed by ill-concealed military intimidation--demanded of
the United States both economic and military support as a
counter. The ideological battle between European communism,
sponsored by the Soviet Union, and the democracies of Western
Europe, allied with the United States, fashioned the Euro-
American relationship for the next four and one-half decades.
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The initial reluctance of the U.S. government to involve
the country in a long-term, entangling alliance with European
countries harkened back to 1796, when George Washington
cautioned against exactly such an endeavor, but the world of
1948 was profoundly different from the world of 1796. Events
in Europe were important because America could not avoid
being affected, and no degree of abstention from involvement
abroad could change that fact. The shots fired at Sarajevo
might have seemed a distant and scarcely newsworthy act to
nearly every American in 1914, but those two shots were the
precursors of millions of echoes which resonated through
Europe over the next thirty-one years. Even after the
European powers were locked at each other's throat, the
American government sought to keep the country aloof,
although through its efforts at doing so the Wilson
administration created conditions which required the United
States to enter the war as a matter of honor, rather than a
matter of pragmatic interest.
As with the traditionalist isolationism of the pre-World
War I period, pre-World War II revisionist isolationism
ensured America would take no action to defend its reasonable
interests until forced to do so. Although the nature of
isolationism had changed, its character remained the same.
George Kennan presents an excellent description of America's
repeate. refusal to respond to threats until forced to do so,
likening a democratic government to
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. . . one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as
long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies
there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little
attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath--in
fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make
him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but,
once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind
determination that he not only destroys his adversary but
largely wrecks his native habitat. You wonder whether it
would not have been wiser for him to have taken a little
more interest in what was going on at an earlier date and
to have seen whether he could not have prevented some of
these situations from arising instead of proceeding from
an undiscriminati indifference to a holy wrath equally
undiscriminating.
Clinging to isolationism as a guidepost for international
policy imperiled America's interests even more thoroughly
prior to World War II. Technological advances had created
new and more efficient ways to drain the lifeblood of
nations, and a unique juxtaposition of dictators leading
powerful governments, the conditions imposed by the
"victors'peace" of Versailles, and a powerful government's
abdication of responsibility for exerting a stabilizing
influence on international reiations brought the world once
again to the battlefield.
Hard-won lessons hammered home a critical fact to U.S.
policy-makers--the future of America could be foreseen in the
future of Europe. After World War II, America almost
immediately began the large-scale military draw-down which
had marked a U.S. reversion to isolationism on previous
occasions. When the events which marked the agenda of
communism in Europe--Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and
180 Kennan, 66.
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Greece, to name only the more outstanding examples--presented
the irrefutable fact that America's interests were threatened
once again, the early and unmistakable manifestations of
post-war isolationism were overcome, and the first
"entangling alliance" was born. That the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization has endured, and the American commitment
to Europe's defense has been maintained, can be largely
attributed to the persistence of the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty
Organization, and the ideological confrontation between the
two alliances, as vital, defined threats to America's
interests.
E. POST-COLD WAR: NON-INTERVENTIONIST INTERNATIONALISM?
The page of history has now turned on the communist
threat to America's interests. The Berlin Wall has fallen.
The communist bloc is in free-fall, and is fracturing into
individual countries which are spiraling toward new, and as
yet vague and nebulous forms of representative government.
Out of the centrifugal explosion of the Soviet-led bloc has
come a popular perception that the "Cold War" is all but
over. With the diminution of the long-standing communist
threat, and the reduced credibility of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization as a politically cohesive military alliance, the
rationale for the current level of American commitment to
European defense is increasingly difficult to support. The
difference between the expenditures which were rationalized
as being necessary to counter the previous level of communist
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threat and the reduced levels which should be needed to
defend a wall which has been reduced to rubble and borders
which have become permeable is being referred to as a "peace
dividend" which can be diverted to programs which support
American social and economic welfare. This line of reasoning
follows very closely on the retreat from international
commitments which America took at the close of both world
wars, and largely chooses to ignore the fact that Europe does
not represent America's total defense requirement. The
recent events in the Persian Gulf should clearly indicate
that the United States should display great interest in
actively exerting its influence abroad.
The U.S. population is ever more aware of the economic
nature of international competition, and with the reduced
external crisis, and is increasingly supportive of non-
interventionist foreign policy. Non-interventionist foreign
policy gains credibility from the successes, however limited,
which the United Nations has enjoyed thus far in responding
to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The unity of the United
Nations Security Council, and of the membership of the United
Nations at large in responding to Iraqi aggression in the
PerL GuLr region, strengthens the arguments of non-
interventionists and represents the possibility of achieving
the ascendancy of the principle of law over that of anarchy
which Woodrow Wilson sought early in the twentieth century.
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Even as non-interventionist policy garners support,
however, the arguments regarding burdensharing gain
credibility from events in the Persian Gulf region. The
United States possesses powerful and very mobile armed
forces. These forces, coupled with the demonstrated
leadership of the United States during the past five decades,
encourages other nations to expect America to serve as the
vanguard in countering aggression. That the position of
leadership does not necessarily command the loyalty of
followers has been repeatedly demonstrated--the Euro-Soviet
pipeline disagreement between the United States and West
Europeans, the disagreement regarding tanker operations in
the Persian Gulf region, and other disputes between the
United States and its allies clearly show that being the
majority shareholder does not necessarily convey the ability
to dictate terms to the partners. As supra-national
organizations, such as the United Nations, rise in
importance, domestic resistance to being the major
contributor to military support for the status auo will
inevitably increase.
Based upon the historical progression demonstrated by
this paper, as the tension of the Cold War continues to
recede, American popular opinion is likely to increasingly
press for legislative representatives to once again stress
internal priorities over external priorities. This pressure
is already beginning to manifest itself in calls for
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increased burdensharing, pressure for unilateral troop
withdrawals from Europe, and insistence upon immediate and
unstructured cuts in American military strength. Failure to
recognize the political potential of isolationist sentiment
invites needless and crippling restrictions on American
influence in international relations.
The United States of America and its armed forces face an
extraordinary period of change in the wake of the Cold War
and the transformations of the international system of
states. The fate of American power abroad is closely linked
with the debate within this country about the purpose of such
power and the sources of its strength. In the view of many
in public life, the economic decline of the United States has
weakened the basis for such power in a dangerous fashion.
This view was put forward most forcefully in 1987 in the work
of Yale University's Professor Paul kennedy. Never very far
from this debate, which has advanced fairly without pause
since the middle of the second Reagan administration, has
been the ideal of the United States attending to its own
matters and turning its back on an ungrateful and inflexible
world of hostilities and blood feuds. In this expression of
a desire to turn away, the participants embrace what is in
fact a very old ideal of U.S. statecraft, that of
isolationism.
The preceding study has addressed the evolution of this
ideal, seeing in it a constant of U.S. political life and
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statecraft, which nonetheless has evolved in turn with the
character of this nation and the world system of states. In
making this assertion, one recalls that certain dilemmas,
certain problems, and certain issues remain constant. Yet
the circumstances surrounding these debates have changed
fundamentally. The efficacy of non-interventionist
internationalism must await its test in practice in the world
being born in the wake of the Cold War and the advent of
Iraqi great-power politics in the Persian Gulf. At all
times, the experience of the past weighs heavily on the
makers of policy and inevitably shapes the choice they make
and the policy they put in hand.
The challenge which faces the United States, with its
legacies of statecraft and its tendency to retreat into a
clean and safe paradise that surely never really existed,
lies simply in the diplomatic and military record of the
twentieth century. The new system must pass the test of the
old; whatever the American people and government might choose
to do with the diplomacy and strategy of this country on the
brink of the new century, they must recall the
accomplishments of the generations that preceded them as they
so eagerly recall those same generations' failures and
shortcomings. The past includes far more than merely Munich
and Danang. Rather it is the combination of these two points
in time and much more. The record of U.S. involvement
overseas in the Cold War seems to have been something of a
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success. The record of U.S. withdrawal and introspection
seems to have been something of a disaster. These insights
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